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Abstract
We study a dynamic game in which information arrives gradually as
long as a principal funds research, and an agent takes an action in each
period. In equilibrium, the principal’s patience is the key determinant of
her information provision: the lower her discount rate, the more eagerly
she funds. When she is sufficiently patient, her information provision
and value function are well-approximated by the ‘Bayesian persuasion’
model. If the conflict of interest is purely belief-based and information
is valuable, then she provides full information if she is patient. We also
obtain a sharp characterisation of the principal’s value function. Our
proofs rely on a novel dynamic programming principle rooted in the
theory of viscosity solutions of differential equations.
1 Introduction
When is research in society’s best interest? Consider the scientific invest-
igation of the extent and implications of man-made climate change. Such
research has the clear benefit of informing policy-making: mitigation is
socially desirable if, and only if, climate change is a severe threat. But
policy-makers do not always take actions that are socially optimal given the
available information. When, then, is it socially beneficial to fund research?
In this paper, we study optimal research funding over time. In our model,
a planner (‘principal’) decides how much information to provide by funding
research over time, and the public (‘agent’) takes an action in each period.
∗We are grateful to Eddie Dekel, Piero Gottardi, Alessandro Pavan and Bruno Strulovici
for guidance and comments, and to Gregorio Curello, Jeff Ely, George Georgiadis, Yingni
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suggestions.
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We characterise all Markov perfect equilibria (with the common belief as
state variable) in which tie-breaking is well-behaved. We characterise how
the planner’s equilibrium information provision depends on her discount rate,
and under what conditions it is close to information provision in Bayesian
persuasion, the natural static benchmark model. When the conflict of interest
is rooted in a difference in prior beliefs, we show that a patient planner
optimally provides full information. In addition, we characterise her value
function, and relate it to the value function in the persuasion benchmark.
Our proofs rely on a novel extension of the dynamic programming principle
to a class of singular and discontinuous stochastic optimisation problems.
Our first result (Proposition 2) shows that socially optimal research
funding (and thus information provision) is decreasing in the discount rate
and in the noisiness of research findings. Thus, the debate about what
discount rate should be used to assess the costs of climate change is also of
key importance for optimal research funding policy. In particular, Stern’s
(2007) proposal that the social discount rate should be low implies that it is
optimal to continue research for longer (and thus to provide more information)
than if the higher rate favoured by Nordhaus (2007) is used.
Our second result (Proposition 3) relates equilibrium information provi-
sion to that in Bayesian persuasion, a natural static benchmark for our model.
It is always socially optimal to provide less information than in the persuasion
benchmark. But if a sufficiently low social discount rate is employed, then
optimal information provision is close to that in the benchmark. Likewise if
research findings are sufficiently precise (not noisy).
Thirdly, we consider the salient special case in which the conflict of in-
terest is purely belief-based: the planner and public have common preferences,
but different priors. We show in Proposition 4 that provided the common
preference values information, it is optimal to provide (exactly) full informa-
tion whenever the social discount rate (or noise) is low enough, regardless
of the priors. In the context of climate change research, this suggests that
if the only friction in policy-making is that the public’s prior belief differs
from the planner’s, then research is always socially beneficial under Stern’s
(2007) low social discount rate.
Fourth, in Proposition 1, we provide a full characterisation of the planner’s
value function. We show that the value may be viewed as a generalisation to
the impatient case of the concave envelope, which is the value function in
the static persuasion benchmark. If the social discount rate and noisiness
of research findings are sufficiently low, then the value function is well-
approximated by the concave envelope (Corollary 1).
Our proof strategy for the aforementioned propositions is to first charac-
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terise the planner’s value function using the HJB (Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman)
equation (obtaining Proposition 1), then to derive implications for behaviour
(Propositions 2, 3 and 4). However, our model is sufficiently general that the
value function need not satisfy the HJB equation in the classical sense.
To deal with this, we prove a novel dynamic programming principle
(Lemma 1) according to which the value function is a viscosity solution of the
HJB equation, extending existing results from the mathematics literature.
This permits us to use the powerful theory of viscosity solutions of differential
equations to characterise the value function in Proposition 1. We view this
as a methodological contribution, and believe that our viscosity approach is
likely to prove useful in other stochastic models in continuous time.
1.1 An example with two actions
There are two characters, the public (or their government) and a social
planner. The state of the world is θ, equal to 1 if anthropogenic climate
change is real and 0 otherwise. The players have a common prior belief
p0 ∈ (0, 2/3) that θ = 1 at time t. Write pt for their (common) belief that
θ = 1 at time t = 0.
At each instant, the public chooses whether to take action to mitigate
and/or adapt to climate change. No action (a = 0) has no cost or benefit.
Taking action costs 1/2, yields a benefit of 3/4 for the public if man-made
climate change is happening (θ = 1), and has no benefit otherwise.1 Given
the belief p, the public’s expected flow payoff is
fa(a, p) =
{
0 for a = 0
3
4p− 12 for a = 1.
The social benefit of taking action against climate change when θ = 1 is
3/2, exceeding the private benefit of 3/4. The planner’s payoff is therefore
fP(a, p) =
{
0 for a = 0
3
2p− 12 for a = 1.
The planner discounts flow payoffs at the social discount rate r > 0.2
1The public does not observe flow payoffs in real time, so cannot infer θ.
2The conflict of interest can be motivated by impatience on the part of the public.
Suppose that the cost of action is paid up-front, and that the benefit is (3/2)r in every
future period. If the public’s discount rate is 2r, then it values this stream of benefits at∫∞
0 e
−2rt(3/2)rdt = (1/2r)(3/2)r = 3/4. The planner values it at 3/2.
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(b) (Part of) an optimal policy.
Figure 1 – Planner’s payoffs and optimal policy.
At each moment, the planner decides whether or not to fund climate
change research.3 Without funding, no research occurs, so the belief pt stays
put. When research is funded, the belief pt evolves as a continuous (Brownian)
martingale: it never jumps, and its changes dpt have mean zero.
Suppose that the planner uses a Markov strategy, meaning that her
funding policy at time t depends only on the current common belief pt. Then
the public cannot influence the planner’s future behaviour, so finds it optimal
to behave myopically, maximising its expected flow payoff period by period.
In particular, it makes policy as follows:
A(p) =
{
0 for p ∈ [0, 2/3)
1 for p ∈ [2/3, 1].
The planner’s flow payoff as a function of the current common belief is then
u(p) := fP(A(p), p), drawn in Figure 1a.
Most of the planner’s best-reply problem is easily solved. When p ∈
(0, 2/3), it is strictly optimal for her to fund research since her flow payoff can
only improve. When p ∈ (2/3, 1), it is weakly optimal to fund research. To
see this, observe that she could fund research only as long as p > 2/3. Then
3We neglect the cost of funding research. We consider this reasonable because the costs
and benefits of mitigating climate change are of much larger magnitude in practice.
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at each instant that she funds, the belief changes by a mean-zero random
increment dp. Since u is affine on the interval (2/3, 1], the expected payoff is
E(u(p+ dp)) = u(p), the same as from not funding. This policy is depicted
in Figure 1b.
The planner faces a non-trivial trade-off at p = 2/3, however. By stopping
research, she can lock in a moderate payoff of 1/2 forever. If she funds research,
then she may increase her payoff toward 1 (if p rises). But if the belief initially
declines, then the planner suffers a zero flow payoff in the near future. The
optimal resolution of this trade-off depends on the planner’s discount rate: a
patient planner will fund research at p = 2/3, while an impatient one will
not.
This leads to our first result: the socially optimal funding of climate
change research hinges on the choice of discount rate. If we follow Stern
(2007) in using a very low social discount rate, then research probably ought
to be funded at p = 2/3. But if we adopt Nordhaus’s (2007) proposal that
the planner should discount using a (much higher) market rate, then it may
be socially optimal to stop research at p = 2/3. This insight generalises: we
show in Proposition 2 that no matter what the payoffs of the planner and the
public, the planner funds more eagerly (and thus provides more information)
the more patient she is. Similarly, the planner funds more keenly the more
informative research is about the state θ.
Our second result relates optimal funding to information provision in
Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica & Gentzkow, 2011). In this static benchmark
model, the planner designs an arbitrary information structure, which induces
a mean-p0 distribution of posterior beliefs p. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
have shown that the planner’s value function in this problem is the concave
envelope of u, which in this case is (cav u)(p) = p, depicted in Figure 2. The
planner’s expected value is therefore p0. She achieves this by providing a fully
informative signal about θ, inducing the beliefs 0 and 1 (with probabilities
1− p0 and p0, respectively).
These are the same beliefs induced with positive probability in the long
run by a patient planner: she funds research until the belief hits either 0
or 1,4 then stops. Thus, when the principal is patient, the static Bayesian
persuasion benchmark provides a good approximation to optimal funding
policy. We generalise this insight in Proposition 3: no matter what the
planner’s and public’s payoffs, the behaviour of a sufficiently patient planner
is well-approximated by the static persuasion benchmark. The same is not
true of an impatient planner, who allows research only while p 6= 2/3, and
4Technically, the belief may converge to 0 or 1, but (a.s.) does not hit either.
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Figure 2 – Value cav u in the static persuasion benchmark.
thus induces the less informative long-run beliefs {0, 2/3}.
The long-run beliefs {0, 1} induced by a patient planner are fully in-
formative. The root of this feature is that the conflict of interest can be
re-interpreted as purely-belief based: the public’s behaviour A can be ra-
tionalised by assuming that it shares the planner’s preferences fP, but has
a different prior. In particular, suppose that the public’s prior pa,0 is lower
than the planner’s. Then no matter what information arrives, its posterior
belief is lower than the principal’s. If pa,0 is chosen appropriately, then the
public’s belief exceeds the threshold 1/3 above which it is optimal to take
action precisely when the principal’s belief exceeds 2/3, so that the strategy
A is (myopically) optimal for the public.
Our third result provides conditions under which the planner optimally
provides full information when the conflict of interest is purely belief-based. In
particular, Proposition 4 asserts that for any common preference that values
information (a convexity condition), a sufficiently patient planner provides
(exactly) full information, whatever the priors. The convexity condition is
satisfied by the preferences in our two-action example, and more generally by
expected-utility preferences. This result suggests that according to Stern’s
(2007) low social discount rate, climate change research is always socially
advantageous.
Our fourth result characterises the planner’s value function as a gener-
alisation of the concave envelope. In the example, the value function v is
depicted in Figures 3a and 3b for low and high values of the discount rate.
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(b) Impatient planner.
Figure 3 – Planner’s value function v.
Both v and cav u are upper envelopes of u that exceed u when convex and
coincide with u when concave. But whereas cav u is affine whenever it exceeds
u, v is strictly convex when it exceeds u due to the planner’s impatience.
Moreover, when the planner is patient (Figure 3a), her value v is (uniformly)
close to cav u. We show that these conclusions hold for arbitrary payoffs:
the value function is an impatience-adjusted cousin of the concave envelope
(Proposition 1), and is uniformly close to the latter when the planner is
patient (Corollary 1).
It is intuitive that the dynamic programming principle should hold,
meaning that the planner’s value function v should satisfy the HJB equation:
v(p) = u(p) + 1
r
max
{
0,
(
p(1− p)
σ
)2 v′′(p)
2
}
.
In words, this says that the value at state p is the flow payoff u(p) plus
the discounted option value of funding, which is proportional to the value
of information v′′(p)/2.5 But the HJB equation simply cannot hold in the
classical sense in Figure 3b: the right-hand side is ill-defined wherever v
has a kink, since v′′ does not exist there. These singularities stem from the
planner’s ability to ‘freeze’ the state variable pt by stopping research.
5The term p(1− p)/σ is the rate at which information arrives while the planner funds
research. We will see in §2.2 why it has this form.
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To deal with this issue, we prove a dynamic programming principle for
problems with singularities and discontinuous flow payoffs. We build on
a result from the mathematics literature: allowing for singularities, if u is
continuous, then v is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation. In Lemma 1,
we extend this theorem to allow the flow payoff u to be discontinuous. This
extension is essential for any economic application in which payoffs depend
on the behaviour of other players, and may have uses beyond this paper.
We use our dynamic programming principle to characterise (for arbitrary
payoffs) the value function (Proposition 1), and thence information provision
(Propositions 2, 3 and 4).
1.2 Related literature
As our principal and agent are symmetrically informed throughout, there is
no communication friction. This distinguishes our work from e.g. Pei (2015),
Argenziano, Severinov and Squintani (2016) and Frug (2017).
Our paper is more closely related to the persuasion literature initiated
by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), Rayo and Segal (2010) and Aumann
and Maschler (1995), and in particular to dynamic persuasion. In contrast
to Ely (2017) and Renault, Solan and Vieille (2017), the state of the world
is constant in our environment.
Orlov, Skrzypacz and Zryumov (2018), Ely and Szydlowski (2017) and
Bizzotto, Rüdiger and Vigier (2017) study dynamic persuasion problems in
which the state is fixed and the agent chooses at each instant whether to
quit irrevocably. By contrast, our agent chooses freely among her actions at
each instant. This is an important difference: whereas the principal would
not benefit from being able to commit ex ante to an information policy in
our environment, she does benefit strictly in these papers.
Henry and Ottaviani (2019) and Siegel and Strulovici (2018, §4) study
dynamic persuasion models with a fixed state in which the principal chooses
when to stop irreversibly, whereupon the agent takes an action and payoffs
are realised.6 Their agent acts only once, and their principal earns a payoff
at that time; by contrast, our agent acts in every period, and our principal
earns a flow payoff throughout. Until she stops, their principal incurs a flow
cost c > 0, absent in our model.7 Both papers focus on how institutional
design can improve welfare, whereas we study equilibrium behaviour in a
fixed game. Siegel and Strulovici (2018, §4) do not have results analogous to
6Brocas and Carrillo (2007) study a similar model, but with no discounting (r = 0) and
in discrete time.
7Another difference is that payoffs are assumed linear in the belief p in these papers.
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any of ours, but their model exhibits similar properties to the special case of
our model with only two or three actions.
Henry and Ottaviani (2019) further assume that there are only two actions
and that the principal’s payoff is independent of the state. In this special
case, the dependence of information provision on patience that we emphasise
(Proposition 2) is entirely absent when (as in our model) c = 0. It becomes
important as soon as the principal’s payoff is allowed to be state-dependent
(the two-action example in §1.1) or there are more than two actions (we give
an example on p. 20). The authors characterise the principal’s value function,
and show that information provision is close to that in Bayesian persuasion
when the cost c is small. These two results are analogous to the specialisation
of our Propositions 1 and 3 to two actions and state-independent preferences.8
The special case is simple enough to permit elementary proofs, with no
need for viscosity methods. Since their assumptions rule out belief-based
disagreement, these authors have no analogue of our Proposition 4.
A question distinct from, but related to, ours is which static models of
information acquisition are equivalent to a model of sequential information
acquisition. In probability theory, Skorokhod-type embedding theorems can
be used to characterise the set of distributions of posterior beliefs that arise
from some sequential sampling rule. Morris and Strack (2017) ask what static
models of costly information acquisition are equivalent to a sequential model
of costly information acquisition.
On the technical side, our model is a stochastic differential game, meaning
a stochastic game in continuous time in which the state evolves according to
an Itô diffusion. Stochastic differential games were introduced by Isaacs (1954,
1965), and have made occasional appearances in economics (see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991, §13.3) for some examples). The central difficulties in the
study of general stochastic differential games are absent in our model because
only one player (the principal) is able directly to influence the evolution of
the state. Like much of this literature, we avoid the technical issues associated
with defining strategies in continuous time (e.g. Simon and Stinchcombe
(1989)) by focussing on Markov perfect equilibria.
Viscosity solutions of differential equations were introduced by Crandall
and Lions (1983). We give a brief exposition and some references in appendix J.
Viscosity solutions have begun to be used in macroeconomics; see in particular
Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions and Moll (2017). The best-reply problem in
these models is simpler than in ours because the flow payoff is continuous,
8Henry and Ottaviani also show that when c is small and the principal is patient, her
value is close to the concave envelope. This is analogous to our Corollary 1.
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singularities cannot arise, and the HJB equation is a first- as opposed to a
second-order differential equation.
2 Model
Our model is a stochastic game in continuous time. There is a principal and
an agent. At each moment, the agent and principal take respective actions
at and λt. Flow payoffs depend on the agent’s action at and on the state pt.
The principal’s action λt affects the stochastic evolution of the state pt. In
particular, λt is the rate at which public information is permitted to arrive,
and pt is the common belief, which evolves according to Bayes’s rule.
2.1 State and payoffs
There is a binary state θ ∈ {0, 1}. The principal and the agent have a common
prior belief p0 that the state is θ = 1.9 Time t ∈ R+ is continuous. The agent
takes an action a ∈ A at each moment, where A is a finite set.
When the agent takes action a and the common belief is p, the principal’s
and agent’s respective flow payoffs are fP(a, p) and fa(a, p), both continuous
in p. Expected utility (fP(a, ·) and fa(a, ·) affine) is a natural special case.
The principal and agent discount flow payoffs at rates r > 0 and ra > 0,
respectively.
2.2 The principal’s information provision
At each instant, the principal can costlessly permit a small amount of public
information to arrive by funding research. In particular, she chooses λt ∈ [0, 1],
and everyone observes the process
dXt = θλtdt+ σ
√
λt dB˜t,
where B˜ is a standard Brownian motion and σ > 0.10 The constraint λt ≤ 1
bounds the rate at which the principal can information. Our qualitative
conclusions would remain intact if this constraint were replaced with a cost
of funding research, but some tractability would be lost.
The assumption that the noise in the signal X is Brownian rules out
information arriving in discrete lumps.11 The volatility σ of the noise con-
9We will drop the common-prior assumption in §6.
10In the background, there is a suitable probability space that carries the process B˜.
11Allowing for lumps complicates the analysis without adding (much) insight.
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strains how rapidly information can arrive. The limit σ → 0 corresponds to
the case in which information can arrive arbitrarily fast.
The signal process admits a natural micro-foundation. For concreteness,
consider the planner–public example: λt is the planner’s funding of research,
and θ = 1 iff anthropogenic climate change is happening. Research produces
a body of evidence which may be summarized by a ‘score’. Write YΛ for
the (random) cumulative score following cumulative research funding Λ, so
that Y˙Λ is today’s score. The score Y˙Λ has mean θ, but is subject to noise
with variance σ2 > 0. Since a white noise is the rate of change of a random
walk, which in continuous time means a Brownian motion, we may write
dYΛ = θdΛ + σdBΛ, where B is a standard Brownian motion.
The ‘time-changed’ white noise t 7→ dBΛt has the same law as the scaled
white noise t 7→ √dΛt/dtdB˜t, where B˜ is a(nother) standard Brownian
motion.12 Cumulative funding evolves over time according to Λt =
∫ t
0 λsds.
The change over time of the cumulative score Xt := YΛt may be therefore be
expressed as
dXt = θdΛt + σdBΛt = θ
dΛt
dt dt+ σ
√
dΛt
dt dB˜t = θλtdt+ σ
√
λt dB˜t.
As the players observe (Xt)t∈R+ , their common belief pt is updated
according to Bayes’s rule. By a well-known result from filtering theory, the
belief evolves as
dpt =
√
λt
pt(1− pt)
σ
dBt,
where B is a standard Brownian motion according to the common belief.13
See e.g. Bolton and Harris (1999, Lemma 1) for a heuristic derivation. By
inspection, the belief process (pt)t∈R+ is a martingale with a.s. continuous
sample paths.
2.3 Strategies and equilibrium
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, in which players’ behaviour depends
on the past only through the current state pt. These equilibria are natural
and standard, and avoid technical issues that can arise in continuous time.
12This is standard—see e.g. Lowther (2010).
13This is (a special case of) the Kushner–Stratonovich equation (e.g. Papanicolaou (2016,
§4.2.2)). The process B is given by dBt = dXt − ptdt and B0 = 0. It is not a Brownian
motion according to the ‘objective’ law of X under either θ = 0 or θ = 1, but it is a
Brownian motion from the point of view of an observer with belief pt, as can seen from
the Girsanov theorem (e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1991, §3.5)).
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We remark, however, that non-Markov equilibria (suitably defined) can differ
qualitatively from Markov perfect ones.
Definition 1. A function [0, 1]→ Rn is piecewise continuous iff its discon-
tinuities form a discrete subset of (0, 1).14
Note that a piecewise continuous function is continuous at 0 and 1. Recall
that a discrete subset of (0, 1) is at most countable.
Definition 2. A strategy of the principal (agent) is a [0, 1]-valued (A-valued)
stochastic process (λt)t∈R+ ((at)t∈R+) adapted to the filtration generated
by (pt)t∈R+ and actions. A (pure) Markov strategy of the principal is a
measurable map Λ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. A Markov strategy of the agent is
a piecewise continuous map A : [0, 1] → ∆(A).15 We identify a Markov
strategy Λ (A) with the strategy (stochastic process) that it induces via
λt := Λ(pt) (at distributed according to A(pt), independently over time).
The restriction to piecewise continuous strategies is a mild assumption
on the agent’s tie-breaking that has no payoff consequences for her, provided
her preferences are non-degenerate in a weak sense.16 The role of piecewise
continuity is to ensure that the principal’s best-reply problem satisfies a
dynamic programming principle (Lemma 1 in §4.1).
Definition 3. A strategy (λt)t∈R+ of the principal is a best reply at p ∈ [0, 1]
to a Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→ ∆(A) of the agent iff it maximises
E
(∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫
A
fP(a, pt)A(da|pt)
]
dt
)
,
where dpt =
√
λt
pt(1− pt)
σ
dBt and p0 = p,
over all [0, 1]-valued processes (λt)t∈R+ adapted to the filtration generated by
(pt)t∈R+ .17 (Note that a best reply must do better than all other strategies,
not only Markov ones.)
A strategy (at)t∈R+ of the agent is undominated iff there is no other
strategy (a′t)t∈R+ that yields the same expected payoff and has fa(a′t, p) >
14A subset of (0, 1) is discrete iff each of its members is an isolated point: it lives in a
neighbourhood that contains no other members.
15∆(A) denotes the set of probability distributions over the (finite) set A.
16We explain why in supplemental appendix I. It is obvious for expected-utility prefer-
ences.
17In principle, the principal can use a process that is adapted to the filtration generated
by (pt)t∈R+ and actions. But when the agent uses a Markov strategy, actions contain no
additional information.
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fa(at, p) a.s. for some p ∈ [0, 1]. A strategy (at)t∈R+ of the agent is a best
reply at p ∈ [0, 1] to a strategy (λt)t∈R+ of the principal iff it is undominated
and maximises
E
(∫ ∞
0
e−ratfa(at, pt)dt
)
,
where dpt =
√
λt
pt(1− pt)
σ
dBt and p0 = p,
over all A-valued processes adapted to the filtration generated by (pt)t∈R+ .
We rule out dominated strategies of the agent as uninteresting. Accom-
modating them is not hard, but complicates the statements of some results.
Definition 4. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of Markov
strategies that are best replies to each other at each p ∈ [0, 1].
2.4 Other interpretations
In §1, we gave the following interpretation of the model: θ is whether man-
made climate change is real, the principal is a social planner who allocates
research funding, and the agent is the public. Two other interpretations are
as follows.
First, suppose that the state θ is whether the president has misbehaved.
The attorney general (principal) can start an independent investigation into
the president’s alleged wrongdoing, and stop it at any time. While it is
ongoing, the investigation releases any findings in real time. The public
(agent) give more support to the president’s party the less likely they think
the president is to be a crook. The attorney general has no private information
about the state, but favours the president’s party. How will the attorney
general behave?
Alternatively: in 1996, pro-gun legislators in the US Congress passed
the Dickey Amendment, which prohibits the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention from conducting research into the causal link between gun
ownership and violence. To model this, let the state θ be whether gun
ownership causes violence. Pro-gun legislators (principal) have a majority
in the legislature, so can decide whether to allow or to ban gun violence
research. The public (agent) agitate for or against gun rights depending on
their belief about the link between guns and violence, and the legislators
want them to support gun rights.
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2.5 Extensions
In §6, we extend the model to allow the principal and agent to have different
priors. Other natural extensions of our model include multiple agents, an
external source of public news (so that pt cannot be totally frozen by setting
λt = 0), a cost of information provision, a stochastically evolving state θ,
more than two states θ, and lumpy information. All of these extensions modify
our results in obvious ways without substantially affecting the qualitative
conclusions. Some of them, such as lumpy information, make the model less
tractable.
A natural alternative model would have the principal provide information
until she decides to stop irreversibly, whereupon the agent acts once and
for all and payoffs are realised. Such a model may describe a prosecutor
gathering evidence before going to trial, or a pharmaceutical firm running
clinical trials before requesting regulatory approval. Models along these lines
are studied by Henry and Ottaviani (2019) and Siegel and Strulovici (2018),
and turn out to have similar properties to ours.
2.6 Benchmark: Static Bayesian persuasion
In static persuasion, the principal flexibly provides information once and for
all—she is not restricted to do it gradually. If the principal induces belief
p, then the agent takes an action A(p) that maximises fa(·, p), giving the
principal a payoff of u(p) := fP(A(p), p). Assume that the agent breaks ties
such that u is upper semi-continuous.18
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) studied this model, and showed the
following. The principal is able to induce all and only distributions of beliefs
whose mean is p0 (‘splits’ of the prior). The principal’s value at prior p0 is
(cav u)(p0), where cav u is the concave envelope of u (the smallest concave
function that majorises u). The principal has an optimal policy that induces
either two beliefs (if (cav u)(p0) > u(p0)) or one belief (if (cav u)(p0) = u(p0)).
We shall see (Proposition 3, Corollary 1) that when the principal is
patient or can provide information rapidly (in particular, when rσ2 is low),
the principal’s value and information provision are close to those in the static
persuasion benchmark.
18Without this assumption, an optimal policy need not exist.
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3 Myopic behaviour by the agent
To avoid uninteresting technicalities, we will focus on MPEs in which the
agent’s tie-breaking is well-behaved. Say that a Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→
∆(A) of the agent is regular iff it breaks ties such that the principal’s induced
payoff u(p) :=
∫
A fP(a, p)A(da|p) is upper semi-continuous. Regular Markov
strategies exist—indeed, any Markov strategy of the agent need be modified
only on a discrete (hence finite or countable) set of beliefs p to be made
regular, and this modification leaves the agent’s flow payoff unchanged.19
Call a Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→ ∆(A) of the agent myopic iff at each
belief p ∈ [0, 1], every action in the support of A(·|p) maximises fa(·, p).
Observation 1. A regular strategy of the agent is part of a MPE iff it is
myopic.
That is: all and only myopic behaviour can be supported in a MPE,
modulo tie-breaking. It follows that our analysis below of the principal’s
behaviour in MPEs carries over to a simpler model with a myopic agent, or
alternatively a sequence of short-lived agents.
Proof. If the principal uses a Markov strategy, then since the agent cannot
affect the evolution of the state, a strategy of hers is a best reply iff it is
myopic. The ‘only if’ part follows.
For the ‘if’ part, fix a regular and myopic Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→
∆(A) of the agent. We show in §5.1 the principal has a best reply, in fact
a Markov one, to any regular A.20 Since A is myopic, it is a best reply. We
have found a MPE. 
Observation 1 implies that Markov perfect equilibria exist, and further
that a principal-preferred MPE exists (by a simple continuity argument). It
also follows that the agent’s behaviour can differ across MPEs only at beliefs
at which she is exactly indifferent, which in turn implies that generically,
under mild conditions, the MPE is partially unique.21
In light of Observation 1, it remains only to characterise the principal’s
best reply to a given regular and myopic strategy of the agent. We will in
19Recall that a Markov strategy is piecewise continuous by definition, and that the
agent’s flow payoff fa(a, ·) is continuous.
20There is no circularity here: the subsequent arguments concerning the principal’s best
reply do not rely on Observation 1.
21In particular, for Lebesgue almost all expected-utility fa (viewed as vectors in R2|A|),
the agent’s strategy differs across MPEs only on a countable set of beliefs. We will see in
§5.1 that the principal’s best reply is generically partially unique.
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fact characterise her best reply to an arbitrary regular Markov strategy. We
proceed in two steps, studying the principal’s value function §4, and then
her best reply in §5.
4 The principal’s value function
Fix a regular Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→ ∆(A) of the agent. The principal’s
induced preferences over beliefs are given by
u(p) :=
∫
A
fP(a, p)A(da|p).
Note that u is piecewise continuous and upper semi-continuous since fP(a, ·)
is continuous and A is piecewise continuous and regular. We will study the
principal’s best-reply problem given an arbitrary piecewise continuous and
upper semi-continuous flow payoff u : [0, 1]→ R.
The principal’s best-reply problem, with (discounted) value function v, is
v(p0) = sup
(λt)t∈R+
E
(
r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtu(pt)dt
)
s.t. dpt =
√
λt
pt(1− pt)
σ
dBt, (BRP)
where (λt)t∈R+ is chosen among all [0, 1]-valued processes adapted to the
filtration generated by (pt)t∈R+ , and p0 is given.
4.1 The HJB equation and viscosity solutions
The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation corresponding to the prin-
cipal’s best-reply problem is the following differential equation in an unknown
function w : [0, 1]→ R:
w(p) = sup
λ∈[0,1]
{
u(p) + 1
r
(√
λ
p(1− p)
σ
)2 w′′(p)
2
}
,
or equivalently
w(p) = u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, w′′(p)
}
. (HJB)
In well-behaved problems, the principal’s best reply problem satisfies a
dynamic programming principle: her value function v is a classical solution
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of (HJB), meaning that v is twice continuously differentiable and that v and
v′′ satisfy (HJB) at every p ∈ (0, 1). The familiar interpretation is that the
value v is today’s flow payoff u plus the expected rate of change of the value,
discounted by r. In the latter term,
√
λp(1− p)/σ is the rate of information
arrival, and v′′(p)/2 is the value of information.
Our problem is not well-behaved, however: we saw in Figure 3b that the
value function v may have a kink. Since v′′ does not exist at kinks, v is not a
classical solution of (HJB) (the right-hand side is ill-defined).22
To be able to use (HJB) to study the value function when the latter
may have kinks, we require a broader notion of ‘solution’ of a differential
equation. Let u? (u?) denote the upper (lower) semi-continuous envelope of
u.23 The envelopes u? and u? differ only on a discrete set since u is piecewise
continuous, and we have u? ≤ u = u? since u is upper semi-continuous.
Definition 5. w : [0, 1]→ R is a viscosity sub-solution (super-solution) of
(HJB) iff it is upper (lower) semi-continuous, and for any twice continuously
differentiable φ : (0, 1)→ R and local minimum p ∈ (0, 1) of φ−w (of w−φ),
w(p) ≤ u?(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(p)
}
(
w(p) ≥ u?(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(p)
})
.
w is a viscosity solution of (HJB) iff it is both a viscosity sub-solution and
super-solution.
Remark 1. It is without loss of generality to restrict attention at each
p ∈ (0, 1) to functions φ that satisfy φ(p) = w(p) and for which φ−w (w−φ)
has a strict global minimum at p.
A brief exposition of the theory of viscosity solutions is given in supple-
mental appendix J. Observe that if w is a viscosity solution of (HJB) and is
twice continuously differentiable on a neighbourhood of p ∈ (0, 1), then it
satisfies (HJB) in the classical sense at p.24
22Even in the absence of a kink (as in Figure 3a), v cannot be a classical solution of
(HJB) unless u is continuous. For whenever u jumps, v′′ must also jump to balance (HJB),
in which case v fails to be twice continuously differentiable.
23That is, the pointwise smallest (largest) upper (lower) semi-continuous function that
majorises (minorises) u.
24This is because we may choose a twice continuously differentiable φ that coincides
with w on a neighbourhood of p, so that φ− w and w − φ are locally minimised at p and
φ′′(p) = w′′(p).
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Although the value function need not satisfy (HJB) in the classical sense,
it does satisfy (HJB) in the viscosity sense:
Lemma 1 (dynamic programming principle). Assume that u is piecewise
continuous. Then v is a viscosity solution of (HJB), with boundary condition
v = u on {0, 1}.
The proof is in appendix A.
We view Lemma 1 as a technical contribution. It extends a well-known
theorem from the stochastic control literature in which the flow payoff u is
assumed to be continuous. That is an unacceptable hypothesis in economic
applications such as ours, where u depends on the endogenous strategic
behaviour of other players.25 Lemma 1 may prove useful for studying other
models of strategic interaction in continuous-time stochastic environments.
4.2 Characterisation of the principal’s value function
We shall characterise the principal’s value v in terms of its local convexity,
defined as follows.
Definition 6. w : [0, 1]→ R is locally (strictly) convex at p ∈ (0, 1) iff
w(p) ≤(<) γw(p′) + (1− γ)w(p′′)
for all p′ < p < p′′ sufficiently close to p, where γ is such that γp′+(1−γ)p′′ =
p. It is locally (strictly) concave at p iff the reverse (strict) inequality holds.26
Let C ⊆ (0, 1) be the beliefs at which v is locally strictly convex, and let
D ⊆ (0, 1) be the (discrete) set of beliefs at which u is discontinuous.
Proposition 1 (value function). v is continuous and satisfies u ≤ v ≤ cav u.
On C, we have v < cav u, and v is once continuously differentiable. On C \D,
we have further that v is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
v(p) = u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 v
′′(p) at each p ∈ C \D. (∂)
On (0, 1) \ C, we have v = u. On {0, 1}, we have u = v = cav u.
Proposition 1 is summarised in Table 1, where Ck means ‘continuous
and k times continuously differentiable’. The ‘smooth pasting’ property in
25By contrast, we have derived our hypothesis of piecewise continuity of u from piecewise
continuity of A, a tie-breaking assumption with no payoff consequences for the agent.
26Note well that (strict) local convexity/concavity at p is weaker than (strict) convex-
ity/concavity on a neighbourhood of p. The function v depicted in Figure 3b is locally
strictly concave at 2/3, but not concave on any neighbourhood of 2/3.
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region properties of v
C \D locally strictly convex u ≤ v < cav u C2 equation (∂)
C ∩D locally strictly convex u ≤ v < cav u C1 smooth pasting
(0, 1) \ C u = v ≤ cav u C0
{0, 1} u = v = cav u C0
Table 1 – Summary of Proposition 1. Ck means ‘continuous and k times
continuously differentiable’.
the entry for the region C ∩D is the following consequence of continuous
differentiability on C: for any sequence (pn)n∈N of beliefs in C \D converging
to p ∈ C ∩D,27 we have
lim
n→∞ v
′(pn) = v′(p).
Remark that since v is only C0 on (0, 1) \ C, it may have (locally concave)
kinks in this region—we saw an example of this in Figure 3b.
The characterisation of v in Proposition 1 is a generalisation of the concave
envelope cav u. Both are upper envelopes of u that exceed u when convex
and coincide with u when concave. But whereas cav u is affine whenever it
exceeds u, v is strictly convex when it exceeds u due to impatience. The
differential equation (∂) pins down the exact form of this strict convexity.
Proposition 1 permits us to solve for the value function. Given a candidate
C ′ for C, (∂) may be solved in closed form on each maximal interval of C ′
up to constants. There is at most one collection of constants that ensures
the properties demanded by Proposition 1, and if there is one then C ′ = C.
We give some details in supplemental appendix F.
In the two-action example of §1.1, Proposition 1 implies that the value
function must have either the strictly convex shape in Figure 3a or the
convex-affine shape in Figure 3b. Proposition 1 further rules out one of the
two; for example, for rσ2 large, the convex candidate violates u ≤ v at 2/3.28
As another example, consider the flow payoff u depicted in Figure 4a,
corresponding to three actions.29 The concave envelope and value function
for high and low values of rσ2 are depicted in Figures 4b–4d.30
27Every point in C ∩D can be reached by such a sequence since every element of D is
isolated by piecewise continuity of u.
28See supplemental appendix F.1 for the details.
29The underlying model has actions A = {0, 1, 3}, flow payoff fP(a, p) = a for the
principal, and payoffs fa(0, p) = 0, fa(1, p) = 2p− 1 and fa(3, p) = 143 p− 3 for the agent.30See supplemental appendix F.2 for the details.
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(a) Flow payoff u.
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(b) Static benchmark value cav u.
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(c) Value v for low rσ2.
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u
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(d) Value v for high rσ2.
Figure 4 – Example with three actions.
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The proof relies heavily on our dynamic programming principle, Lemma 1.
In particular, the three lemmata below are derived using the fact that v is a
viscosity solution of (HJB).
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 1, v is a viscosity solution of (HJB)
satisfying v = u on {0, 1}. It follows that v is continuous. The fact that
u = cav u on {0, 1} follows from upper semi-continuity of u. We have u ≤ v
because for any p ∈ [0, 1], the value u(p) is attainable (by setting λ = 0
forever), so must be lower than the optimal value v(p).
To show that v ≤ cav u, take any p ∈ [0, 1], and consider the auxiliary
problem in which the principal may choose any [0, 1]-valued process (pt)t∈R+
satisfying E(pt) = p for every t ∈ R+. The value V (p) of this problem must
exceed v(p) since any belief process the principal can induce in her best-reply
problem is available in the auxiliary problem. And we have V (p) = (cav u)(p)
since the auxiliary problem consists of a sequence of independent static
persuasion problems (one for each instant t), in each of which the optimal
value is (cav u)(p) since u is upper semi-continuous.
For (0, 1) \ C, we show in appendix B that
Lemma 2. On (0, 1) \ C, we have v = u.
Now for C. In appendix C, we prove that
Lemma 3. v is continuously differentiable on C.
To show that v < cav u on C, take p ∈ C and p′ < p < p′′ sufficiently close
to p, and let γ ∈ (0, 1) satisfy γp′ + (1− γ)p′′ = p. We have
v(p) < γv(p′) + (1− γ)v(p′′) since p ∈ C
≤ γ(cav u)(p′) + (1− γ)(cav u)(p′′) since v ≤ cav u
≤ (cav u)(p) since cav u is concave.
Finally, consider C \D. We have
Lemma 4. On C \D, v is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies (∂).
This lemma is proved in appendix D. 
Taking the patient limit rσ2 → 0 in Proposition 1 yields
Corollary 1. As rσ2 decreases, v increases pointwise. As rσ2 → 0, v con-
verges uniformly to cav u.
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Corollary 1 shows that when the principal is patient or able to provide
information rapidly, the static persuasion model provides a good approxima-
tion to the principal’s equilibrium value. We saw by example in Figures 3b
and 4d that cav u may approximate v poorly when the principal is impatient
or highly restricted.
Proof. To emphasise dependence on parameters, write the value as vrσ2 .
For the first part, fix an arbitrary p0 ∈ [0, 1]. Using the the change of
variable s := rt, we may rewrite the best-reply problem (BRP) at prior
p0 ∈ [0, 1] as
vrσ2(p0) = sup
(λ′s)s∈R+
E
(∫ ∞
0
e−su(ps)ds
)
s.t. dps =
√
λ′s ps(1− ps)dB̂s,
where B̂s :=
√
rBt is a standard Brownian motion, and
(λ′s)s∈R+ =
(
λs/rσ
2
)
s∈R+
is chosen among all
[
0, 1/rσ2
]
-valued processes adapted to the filtration
generated by (ps)s∈R+ . Since lowering rσ2 slackens the constraint λ′s ≤ 1/rσ2
in every period, it raises the value vrσ2(p0).
Now for the second part. We have established for every p ∈ [0, 1] that
the sequence (vrσ2(p))rσ2>0 is increasing. Since it lives in the compact
set [u(p), (cav u)(p)] by Proposition 1, it must converge to some v0(p) ∈
[u(p), (cav u)(p)]. In other words, (vrσ2)rσ2>0 converges pointwise to some
function v0 : [0, 1]→ R satisfying u ≤ v0 ≤ cav u. We claim that v0 = cav u.
Since cav u is by definition the pointwise smallest concave majorant of u, it
suffices to show that v0 is concave.
To that end, take p′ < p < p′′ in [0, 1], and let γ ∈ (0, 1) be such that
γp′ + (1− γ)p′′ = p; we will establish that γv0(p′) + (1− γ)v0(p′′) ≤ v0(p).
Consider the principal’s best-reply problem (BRP) with prior p0 = p and
parameters r > 0 and σ2 > 0. By a change of variable akin to the one in the
first part of the proof, we may consider the payoff-equivalent problem with
unit signal noise and discount rate rσ2 (and λt chosen from [0, 1]). Consider
the strategy that always sets λ = 1, and let (pt)t∈R+ be the induced belief
process. Write τ for the first time that (pt)t∈R+ hits {p′, p′′}. Following the
proposed strategy until time τ and then behaving optimally cannot be better
than optimal, so for every rσ2 > 0 we have
E
(
rσ2
∫ τ
0
e−rσ
2tu(pt)dt+ e−rσ
2τvrσ2(pτ )
)
≤ vrσ2(p) ≤ v0(p),
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where the second inequality holds since vrσ2 increases pointwise as rσ2
declines. As rσ2 → 0, the first term inside the expectation on the left-hand
side vanishes a.s., and the second term converges a.s. to v0(pτ ). Since both
terms are bounded, the left-hand side converges to E(v0(pτ )) by the bounded
convergence theorem (e.g. Theorem 16.5 in Billingsley (1995)). And we have
E(v0(pτ )) = γv0(p′) + (1− γ)v0(p′′)
by the optional sampling theorem (e.g. Theorem 3.22 in Karatzas and Shreve
(1991, ch. 1)).31
We have proved that vrσ2 converges monotonically, pointwise, to cav u.
Since vrσ2 and cav u are continuous and defined on a compact domain, it
follows by Dini’s theorem (e.g. Theorem 7.13 in Rudin (1976)) that the
convergence of vrσ2 to cav u is uniform. 
5 Equilibrium information provision
Having characterised the principal’s value function (Proposition 1), we are
ready to study her information provision in equilibrium. We shall first estab-
lish that she provides more information the more patient she is (Proposition 2,
§5.2). Secondly, in Proposition 3 (§5.3), we will show that her information
provision is less generous than in the static persuasion benchmark, but close
to the latter if she is sufficiently patient.
5.1 Induced beliefs in the long run
As in §4, fix a regular Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→ ∆(A).
Corollary 2. The following Markov strategy is a best reply:
Λ?(p) =
{
1 if v(p) > u(p)
0 otherwise.
Proof. When v = u, setting λ = 0 clearly attains the value v in the principal’s
problem (BRP). When v > u, λ > 0 must be optimal. By inspection of the
principal’s problem, λ = 1 is optimal whenever λ > 0 is. 
31When 0 < p′ < p′′ < 1, we have E(τ) <∞, so the optional sampling theorem yields
E(pτ ) = p, whence P(pτ = p′) = γ and P(pτ = p′′) = 1 − γ by definition of γ. For the
case in which 0 < p′ < p′′ = 1 (the other cases are analogous), let τn be the first time
that (pt)t∈R+ hits {p′, 1− 1/n}, for each n ∈ N. Then E(τn) <∞, so E (pτn) = p by the
optional sampling theorem. Since (pτn)n∈N is bounded and converges a.s. to pτ as n→∞,
the bounded convergence theorem yields E (pτ ) = p.
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The strategy Λ? provides information at full tilt when it is strictly valuable,
and provides none otherwise. It is partially unique.32
Under this strategy, the belief pt evolves according to dpt = σ−1pt(1−
pt)dBt until it hits the (closed) set {v = u}, then stays constant forever.
Since (pt)t∈R+ is a bounded martingale, it converges a.s. by the martingale
convergence theorem.33 Write F for the distribution of the limiting random
variable. The support of F is the set of beliefs that the principal induces
(with positive probability) in the long run. Note that F has mean p0 since
each pt does.34
Corollary 3. Fix a prior p0. A best reply of the principal induces the beliefs
{p−, p+} in the long run, where
p− := sup{p ∈ [0, p0] : v(p) = u(p)}
p+ := inf{p ∈ [p0, 1] : v(p) = u(p)}.
Proof. The best reply Λ? from Corollary 2 obviously induces {p−, p+}. 
Provided v(p0) > u(p0) (the interesting case), the long-run induced beliefs
{p−, p+} that we study are generically the unique ones consistent with a best
reply.35 In general, they are the least extreme beliefs induced by some best
reply.36
5.2 Comparative statics
The principal provides more information the more patient she is:
Proposition 2 (comparative statics). Fix a prior p0. As rσ2 decreases, p−
decreases and p+ increases.
Proof. Write {v > u} for the set of beliefs at which the strategy Λ? from
Corollary 2 provides information. As rσ2 decreases, v increases pointwise by
Corollary 1, so {v > u} increases in the sense of set inclusion, and thus
p− = sup ([0, p0] \ {v > u})
decreases and p+ similarly increases. 
32Precisely: any best reply must have Λ > 0 on {v > u}, Λ = 1 a.e. on {v > u}, and
Λ = 0 a.e. on {v = u}\K, where K ⊆ (0, 1) is the set on which u is locally (weakly) convex.
Anything is optimal on {v = u}∩K. (In Figure 3b (p. 7), we have {v = u}∩K = (2/3, 1).)
33E.g. Theorem 3.15 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991, ch. 1).
34By the bounded convergence theorem (e.g. Theorem 16.5 in Billingsley (1995)).
35See supplemental appendix G for a discussion.
36Because any best reply must set Λ > 0 on {v > u}.
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By way of illustration, consider the two-action example of §1.1: whereas a
patient planner induces the long-run beliefs {0, 1}, an impatient one induces
the less informative beliefs {0, 2/3}. Similarly, in the three-action example of
Figure 4 (p. 20), the long-run induced beliefs are more extreme when the
principal is patient ({0, 3/4} rather than {1/2, 3/4}).
Recall from §1 the controversy between Stern (2007) and Nordhaus
(2007) about what discount rate society should use to value how climate
change will affect future generations. According to Proposition 2, the choice
social discount rate also bears crucially on optimal funding of climate change
research. In particular, when funding research is socially optimal given Stern’s
low proposed discount rate (as at p = 1/2 in Figure 3a), it may be that
stopping research is socially optimal if Nordhaus’s higher rate is used instead
(as in Figure 3b). The underlying trade-off is illustrated by the two-action
example of §1.1: while stopping at p = 2/3 is safe, continuing yields possible
losses in the near future and potential gains in the further future, and thus
what is optimal depends on how severely future payoffs are discounted.
Proposition 2 also states that more information is provided the lower the
noisiness σ2 of the signal process. Intuitively, this is because lowering the
noise accelerates the rate at which information arrives, effectively ‘speeding
up time’, which is equivalent in payoff terms to lowering the discount rate.37
It is worth noting that Proposition 2 generalises: in particular, it contin-
ues to hold if information can arrive in discrete lumps. Indeed, Quah and
Strulovici (2013) have shown that in a large class of Markov stopping prob-
lems, a less patient decision-maker stops more eagerly. While the economic
force is the same, our result is not a special case of theirs because their
assumptions are not satisfied by our model.38
5.3 Comparison with the static persuasion benchmark
We next characterise how equilibrium information provision compares with
that in the static persuasion benchmark. It is well-known (see Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011)) that given p0, an optimal policy in the static persuasion
problem induces the beliefs {P−, P+}, where
P− := sup{p ∈ [0, p0] : (cav u)(p) = u(p)}
P+ := inf{p ∈ [p0, 1] : (cav u)(p) = u(p)}.
It follows that either one or two beliefs are induced, depending on p0.
37This can be seen formally in the proof of Corollary 1 (p. 21).
38In particular, Quah and Strulovici (2013) assume that the stochastic process Ut := u(pt)
is right-continuous, which only true in our model if u is continuous.
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Given Proposition 2, it is intuitive that less information will be provided
in the dynamic model than in the benchmark, since the latter corresponds
(informally) to the case r = 0 of perfect patience. The following result shows
in addition that information provision by a patient principal is close to that
in the persuasion benchmark:
Proposition 3 (persuasion connection). Fix a prior p0. For any rσ2 > 0,
we have P− ≤ p− ≤ p+ ≤ P+. As rσ2 → 0, p− → P− and p+ → P+.
Proposition 3 also implies that holding the impatience r > 0 of the
principal fixed, her information provision is close to the persuasion benchmark
if the signal process is precise (low noisiness σ2).
To illustrate, consider the two-action example of §1.1. In the patient case
depicted in Figure 3a, the same information is provided as in persuasion:
P− = p− = 0 < 1 = p+ = P+. But in the impatient case in Figure 3b,
strictly less information is provided than in the benchmark: P− = p− = 0
and p+ = 2/3 < 1 = P+. Similarly, in the three-action example in Figure 4,
the benchmark and patient long-run induced beliefs are {0, 3/4}, but an
impatient planner induces the less extreme beliefs {1/2, 3/4}. The examples
show that if the principal is impatient, then the persuasion benchmark may
provide a poor approximation to equilibrium information provision.
In the two- and three-action examples, the long-run induced beliefs of a
sufficient patient planner coincide with the induced beliefs in the persuasion
benchmark rather than merely converging as per Proposition 3. This need
not happen—we give an example in supplemental appendix H in which
P− < p− < p+ < P+ for every rσ2 > 0.
Although it is intuitive that long-run induced beliefs should converge
to the persuasion ones as rσ2 → 0, the result is not obvious. To see this,
observe that the analogous result for the impatient limit rσ2 →∞ is false!
For this limit, the natural static benchmark is the trivial model in which
no information is available, so that the belief stays put at the prior p0. It
is not true that p− and p+ converge to p0 as rσ2 → ∞: indeed, in the
two-action example of §1.1, the (uniquely optimal) long-run induced beliefs
are {p−, p+} = {0, 2/3} for every low value of rσ2 > 0.39
Proof. To emphasise dependence on parameters, write vrσ2 , p−rσ2 and p
+
rσ2
for the value and long-run beliefs. Let {vrσ2 > u} be the set of beliefs at
which the strategy Λ? in Corollary 2 funds research.
39The key formal difference between the two limits is that the convergence of v to cav u as
rσ2 → 0 is uniform by Corollary 1 (p. 21), whereas the convergence of v to u as rσ2 →∞
is merely pointwise (unless u is continuous).
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For the first part, fix a rσ2 > 0. Clearly P− ≤ P+. By Proposition 1,
u(p) < vrσ2(p) implies u(p) < (cav u)(p), so that {vrσ2 > u} ⊆ {cav u > u}.
Therefore
P− = sup ([0, p0] \ {cav u > u}) ≤ sup ([0, p0] \ {vrσ2 > u}) = p−rσ2 ,
and similarly p+rσ2 ≤ P+.
Now for the second part. Since p−rσ2 decreases monotonically as rσ
2 does
by Proposition 2, and lives in the compact set [P−, p0], it converges to some
limit p−0 ∈ [P−, p0]. We wish to show that p−0 = P−, so suppose toward a
contradiction that p−0 > P−. On the one hand,
(cav u)
(
p−rσ2
)
→ (cav u)
(
p−0
)
> u
(
p−0
)
(1)
by continuity of cav u and p−0 > P− (recall the definition of P−). On the
other hand, (recalling the definition of p−rσ2 ,)∣∣∣(cav u) (p−rσ2)− u (p−rσ2)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(cav u) (p−rσ2)− vrσ2 (p−rσ2)∣∣∣→ 0
since vrσ2 converges uniformly to cav u by Corollary 1 (p. 21).40 It follows
by upper semi-continuity of u that
(cav u)
(
p−rσ2
)
→ lim
rσ2→0
u
(
p−rσ2
)
≤ u
(
p−0
)
a contradiction with (1). A similar argument shows that p+rσ2 → P+. 
6 Heterogeneous priors
In this section, we drop the common-prior assumption. We first show (§6.1)
that our preceding characterisation of equilibrium welfare and information
provision remains valid.
We then focus on the special case in which the conflict of interest between
the principal and agent derives from their differing beliefs alone. We show in
Proposition 4 (§6.3) that when information is valuable, a sufficiently patient
principal provides full information, regardless of the priors. If disagreement
about climate change policy is rooted in differing prior beliefs, then this result
suggests that climate change research is always socially valuable according
to Stern’s (2007) social discount rate.
In supplemental appendix E, we give conditions under which the principal
is better-off the smaller the prior disagreement.
40See e.g. Theorem 7.11 in Rudin (1976).
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6.1 Equilibrium characterisation
The model is as in §2, except that the priors p0, pa,0 ∈ (0, 1) of the principal
and agent may differ. They agree to disagree—the difference in priors is
not rooted in private information. Write pt and pa,t for the principal’s and
agent’s beliefs at time t.
The extended model is tractable because we need not keep track of the
agent’s belief, as we can back it out from the principal’s belief and the priors:
Observation 2. The agent’s time-t belief is pa,t = φ(pt, p0, pa,0), where
φ(pt, p0, pa,0) :=
pt
pt + (1− pt)D(p0, pa,0)
and D(p0, pa,0) :=
p0
1− p0
/
pa,0
1− pa,0 .
Proof. Write `1t /`0t for the likelihood ratio of the (random) observation
(Xs)s∈[0,t].41 By Bayes’s rule,
pt
1− pt =
p0
1− p0
`1t
`0t
and
pa,t
1− pa,t =
pa,0
1− pa,0
`1t
`0t
= 1
D(p0, pa,0)
p0
1− p0
`1t
`0t
.
Combining and rearranging yields the result. 
To illustrate, consider the two-action example from §1.1. Let the planner
have prior p0 = 1/2. Suppose that the public shares the planner’s preference
fP, but that its prior is pa,0 = 1/5. Then by Observation 2, the public’s
payoffs from the two actions in terms of the planner’s belief p are fa(a, p) = 0
and
fa(1, p) =
3
4φ(p, 1/2, 1/5)−
1
2 =
3
4
p
4− 3p −
1
2 ,
depicted in Figure 5b. The public finds it myopically optimal to take action
a = 1 when pa,0 ≥ 1/3, which occurs precisely when p ≥ 2/3. This is the
agent’s (Markov) strategy from §1.1.
In light of Observation 2, MPEs have all of the same properties as in the
common-prior case. For the same reason as in Observation 1 (§3), a regular
41Formally, ‘`1t/`0t ’ is the Radon–Nikodým derivative of the law of (Xs)s∈[0,t] under θ = 1
with respect to its law under θ = 0.
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(a) Planner’s flow payoff.
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(b) Public’s flow payoff.
Figure 5 – Flow payoffs of actions as a function of the planner’s belief p.
Markov strategy A : [0, 1]→ ∆([0, 1]) is part of a MPE iff it is myopic. Given
a regular Markov strategy A, the principal’s induced flow payoff is now
u(p) :=
∫
A
fP(a, p)A(da|φ(p, p0, pa,0))
since the agent’s belief is φ(p, p0, pa,0) when the principal’s is p. (Note that
u depends on the priors.) It remains true that u is piecewise continuous and
upper semi-continuous. Given u, the principal’s best-reply problem is un-
changed, noting again that pt is the principal’s belief.42 All preceding results
therefore remain valid: the principal’s value function is a generalised concave
envelope (Proposition 1), she provides more information the more patient
she is (Proposition 2), and her information provision is well-approximated
by static persuasion when she is sufficiently patient (Proposition 3).
6.2 Belief-based conflict of interest
With heterogeneous priors, there is typically a conflict of interest between
the principal and agent even if they have the same objectives. To focus on
this issue, we assume henceforth that preferences at each belief p ∈ [0, 1] are
the same, so that fP = fa = f .43 We ask how the extent of disagreement
42It is important that we use the principal’s belief. The agent’s belief is not a martingale
from the principal’s perspective, as she expects it to drift toward her own.
43In the special case of expected utility, this is equivalent to players having the same
preferences conditional on the state θ.
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between the priors p0 and pa,0 impacts information provision (§6.3) and the
principal’s welfare (supplemental appendix E).
We saw in the previous section that the agent’s behaviour A in the
two-action example from §1.1 is consistent with a belief-based conflict of
interest. By contrast, the agent’s behaviour in the three-action example in
Figure 4 cannot arise from a purely belief-based conflict of interest: if the
agent had the principal’s payoff fP(a, p) = a, then she would strictly prefer
action 3 at every belief (no matter what the priors).
6.3 Full information provision
When the conflict of interest is purely belief-based, there is an additional force
that favours more information provision by the principal. When beliefs are
close, the principal can rely on the agent to make good use of information by
taking actions that the principal likes, suggesting that the principal improves
her payoff by providing information. And providing information tends to
make the beliefs move closer: indeed, if research is funded forever, then both
beliefs converge a.s. to either 0 or 1.
There are two gaps in this reasoning. First, for arbitrary preferences f ,
information need not be valuable: the principal could well prefer less-than-
full information even if she were to choose actions herself.44 To ensure that
information is valuable, we assume that f(a, ·) is convex for every action
a ∈ A. This allows for expected utility, where f(a, ·) is affine.
Secondly, although information provision tends to bring the beliefs closer,
it may take a long time. In the interim, the agent may take actions that the
principal dislikes, and this may cause the principal to provide little or no
information. To make sure that this short-term effect does not dominate, we
consider the patient case (rσ2 small).
To avoid trivialities, we also assume that f is non-degenerate, by which
we mean that (i) there are actions a, a′ ∈ A and beliefs p, p′ ∈ [0, 1] such
that f(a, p) > f(a′, p) and f(a, p′) < f(a′, p′), and (ii) there is an ε > 0
such that maxa∈A f(a, ·) = f(a0, ·) on [0, ε) (= f(a1, ·) on (1 − ε, 1]) for
some a0, a1 ∈ A. Part (ii) says that the agent doesn’t want to switch actions
infinitely frequently near 0 or 1, and holds for expected-utility preferences.
For similarly technical reasons, we focus on pure-strategy MPEs.
Proposition 4 (full information). Suppose that fP = fa = f , where f(a, ·)
is convex for each a ∈ A and f is non-degenerate. Let the agent use a pure
44Consider A = {0} and f(0, ·) = p(1− p). Then u is strictly concave regardless of the
priors, so the principal strictly prefers to stop immediately.
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and regular Markov strategy. Then for any fixed priors p0 and pa,0, we have
{p−, p+} = {0, 1} for all sufficiently small rσ2 > 0.
In the context of climate change research, the conflict of interest may
be purely belief-based. Proposition 4 then suggests that on Stern’s (2007)
proposal of a very low social discount rate, climate change research is always
socially beneficial, so should be funded. By contrast, climate change research
may sometimes be socially detrimental if we adopt the higher discount rate
advocated by Nordhaus (2007).
We showed by example that convexity and high patience are both needed
for the result. The three-action example in Figure 4 (p. 20) shows that it is
also essential that the conflict of interest be purely belief-based: by inspection,
the principal never induces more informative long-run beliefs than {0, 3/4}.
Proof. Fix priors p0 and pa,0. We proceed in three steps. We first show that
cav u > u on (0, 1), by convexity and part (i) of non-degeneracy. Next, using
Corollary 1 and part (ii) of non-degeneracy, we find an η > 0 such that
rσ2 < η implies v > u on the closure of the set D′ of discontinuities of
the agent’s strategy A. Finally, we use convexity to show that v > u on
all of (0, 1) whenever rσ2 < η, which by Corollary 2 suffices to prove the
proposition.
Step 1: cav u > u on (0, 1): Define u(p) := maxa∈A f(a, p), the principal’s
flow payoff if she were to choose actions herself. This function is convex
since each f(a, ·) is. It follows that cav u is affine, and (since u is upper
semi-continuous) that cav u = u on {0, 1}. By part (i) of non-degeneracy
of f , u cannot be affine.45 Since u is convex and non-affine, it must satisfy
cav u > u on (0, 1).
Let u be the flow payoff corresponding to the fixed priors p0 and pa,0.
Clearly u ≥ u, with equality on {0, 1}. Thus cav u is a concave function
majorising u. There is no pointwise smaller concave function majorising
u since cav u is affine and coincides with u on {0, 1}. This shows that
cav u = cav u, and thus cav u = cav u > u ≥ u on (0, 1), as desired.
Step 2: v > u on clD′: Let A be the agent’s (pure) strategy. Write D′
for the set of of discontinuities of A, and clD′ its closure.46 D′ is a discrete
subset of (0, 1) since a strategy is piecewise continuous by definition.
By part (ii) of non-degeneracy, we have D′ ⊆ [ε, 1 − ε] for some ε > 0,
and thus likewise for clD′. Observe that cav u− u is a lower semi-continuous
45In detail: suppose to the contrary that u is affine. Then by definition of u and the
convexity of f(a, ·) for each a ∈ A, it must be that u(·) = f(a, ·) for some single a ∈ A,
which contradicts non-degeneracy of f .
46Clearly D′ contains the set D of discontinuities of u.
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function since cav u is continuous and u is upper semi-continuous. Since
cav u− u > 0 on the compact set [ε, 1− ε] ⊆ (0, 1), it follows that
k := inf
p∈clD′
[(cav u)(p)− u(p)] ≥ inf
p∈[ε,1−ε]
[(cav u)(p)− u(p)] > 0.
Now choose δ ∈ (0, k). Since v converges uniformly to cav u as rσ2 → 0
by Corollary 1 (p. 21), we may find an η > 0 such that rσ2 < η implies
sup
p∈clD′
[(cav u)(p)− v(p)] < δ.
(We will use this η throughout the remainder of the proof.) We then have
inf
p∈clD′
[v(p)− u(p)] = inf
p∈clD′
{[(cav u)(p)− u(p)]− [(cav u)(p)− v(p)]}
≥ inf
p∈clD′
[(cav u)(p)− u(p)]− sup
p∈clD′
[(cav u)(p)− v(p)] ≥ k − δ > 0.
Step 3: v > u on (0, 1): To complete the proof, it suffices by Corollary 2
(p. 23) to show that v > u on (0, 1), for then {p−, p+} = {0, 1}.
Suppose first that D′ is empty. Then since agent’s strategy A is pure,
there is an action a ∈ A such that u(·) = f(a, ·) on (0, 1). Thus u is convex
on (0, 1) since f(a, ·) is. Since u is continuous at 0 and at 1 by piecewise
continuity, it follows that u is convex on all of [0, 1].
Take any p ∈ (0, 1), and consider the principal’s best-reply problem
(BRP) with prior p0 = p. The strategy that sets λ = 1 always cannot be
better than optimal, so
v(p) ≥ E
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtu(pt)dt
)
>
∫ ∞
0
e−rtu(p)dt = u(p),
where the strict inequality used the fact that u is convex and non-affine.
For the remainder, we assume that D′ is non-empty. Take any p′ ∈ D′. We
claim that p′ has a successor in clD′∪{1}.47 Suppose toward a contradiction
that it does not. Since it clearly has upper bounds (viz. 1), it must be that for
every ε > 0, there is p+ ∈ (p′, p′+ε)∩ (clD′∪{1}) such that p′ < p+ < p′+ε.
It follows that p′ is not an isolated point of clD′. But then p′ cannot lie in
D′ since the latter is discrete—a contradiction.
Furthermore, p′ = 0 has a successor in clD′ ∪ {1}. The least upper
bound of 0 in clD′ ∪{1} is evidently inf clD′, which lies in clD′. To see that
0 6= inf clD′, simply recall that D′ ⊆ [ε, 1− ε] for some ε > 0.
47The successor of p′ ∈ (0, 1) in a set A ⊆ [0, 1] is the least upper bound of p′ in A\{p′}.
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It follows that (0, 1) may be partitioned into clD′ along with (at most
countably many) intervals (p′, p′′), where either (a) p′ ∈ D′ ∪ {0} and p′′ is
the successor of p′ in clD′ ∪ {1}, or (b) p′ is an element of clD′ \D′ that
has a successor in clD′ ∪ {1} and p′′ is that successor. Since v > u on clD′
whenever rσ2 < η by step 2, it remains only to show that v > u on every
(p′, p′′) when rσ2 < η.
To that end, fix an interval (p′, p′′) of the sort just described. Since we
supposed D′ to be non-empty, it must be either that 0 < p′ or that p′′ < 1.
We assume the former, omitting the analogous argument for the latter case.
Define u◦ : [p′, p′′]→ R by
u◦(p) :=

u(p′+) for p = p′
u(p) for p ∈ (p′, p′′)
u(p′′−) for p = p′′.
u◦ is well-defined and continuous since u is continuous on (p′, p′′) ⊆ (0, 1)\D′.
It clearly satisfies u◦ ≤ u? = u.
We claim that u◦ is convex. To see this, remark first that since (p′, p′′)
does not intersect D′ and the agent’s strategy is pure, there must be an action
a ∈ A such that u(·) = f(a, ·) on (p′, p′′). Since f(a, ·) is convex, it follows
that u◦ is convex on (p′, p′′). To conclude, observe that u◦ is continuous at
p′ and at p′′ by construction, so is convex on its entire domain [p′, p′′].
Take p ∈ (p′, p′′); we will show that v(p) > u(p). Since rσ2 < η, we
have v > u on clD′, so in particular v(p′) > u(p′) and v(p′′) ≥ u(p′′).48
Consider the strategy that lets λ = 1 until the first time τ that the belief
process (pt)t∈R+ with initial condition p0 = p hits {p′, p′′}, and subseqently
behaves optimally. By the optional sampling theorem (e.g. Theorem 3.22 in
Karatzas and Shreve (1991, ch. 1)), the probability that pτ = p′ is γ given
by p = γp′+ (1− γ)p′′.49 Since behaving optimally is weakly better than this
48The latter inequality strict iff p′′ 6= 1.
49The optional sampling theorem applies directly when p′′ < 1, as then clearly E(τ) <∞.
In the case p′′ = 1, let τn be the first time that (pt)t∈R+ hits {p′, 1 − 1/n} for n ∈ N.
Clearly E(τn) < ∞, so E (pτn) = p by the optional sampling theorem. Since (pτn)n∈N
is bounded and converges a.s. to pτ as n→∞, we may apply the bounded convergence
theorem (e.g. Theorem 16.5 in Billingsley (1995)) to obtain E (pτ ) = p, as desired.
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strategy, and u ≥ u◦, we have
v(p) ≥ E
(
r
∫ τ
0
e−rtu◦(pt)dt+ γe−rτv(p′) + (1− γ)e−rτv(p′′)
)
≥ E
(
r
∫ τ
0
e−rtu◦(p)dt+ γe−rτv(p′) + (1− γ)e−rτv(p′′)
)
= E
((
1− e−rτ )u◦(p) + e−rτ [γv(p′) + (1− γ)v(p′′)])
> E
((
1− e−rτ )u◦(p) + e−rτ [γu◦(p′) + (1− γ)u◦(p′′)])
≥ E ((1− e−rτ )u◦(p) + e−rτu◦(p))
= u(p),
where we used convexity of u◦ (the second inequality), v(p′) > u(p′) ≥ u◦(p′)
and v(p′′) ≥ u(p′′) ≥ u◦(p′′) (the strict inequality), convexity of u◦ again (the
final inequality), and u◦ = u on (0, 1) (the last line). 
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1 (p. 18)
The boundary condition v = u on {0, 1} holds by inspection of the principal’s
best-reply problem (BRP), since these are absorbing states. For the remainder,
let v? and v? be the lower and upper semi-continuous envelopes of v. In
Lemma 1(a), we show that piecewise continuity of u suffices for v? to be
a viscosity super-solution. In Lemma 1(b), we prove that v? is a viscosity
sub-solution, without requiring piecewise continuity. In both cases, we adapt
the standard proof. Finally, we establish in Lemma 1(c) that v is continuous,
so that v? = v? = v.50 We will make occasional use of the fact that v ≥ u,
which holds since the value u is attainable (by never funding research).
First, the super-solution property of v?, which relies on piecewise con-
tinuity of u:
Lemma 1(a). If u is piecewise continuous, then v? is a viscosity super-
solution of (HJB).
Proof. We follow the standard argument (e.g. Pham (2009, Proposition
4.3.1)), which assumes that u is continuous. We sketch the steps that are
unchanged, and emphasise the juncture at which a new argument is needed
to accommodate merely piecewise continuity of u.
50As we explain in supplemental appendix J.2, it is typical to replace the last step with
an appeal to a comparison principle. Since we are not aware of a comparision principle
that requires only piecewise continuity of u, we prove continuity directly instead.
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Take any p ∈ (0, 1) and any twice continuously differentiable φ : (0, 1)→
R such that v? − φ has a local minimum at p. In light of Remark 1, we may
assume without loss of generality that v?(p)− φ(p) = 0 and that v? − φ ≥ 0
(i.e. p is a global minimum of v? − φ.) We wish to show that
v?(p) ≥ u?(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(p)
}
.
We have v? ≥ u? since v ≥ u, so what must be shown is that
v?(p) ≥ u?(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 φ
′′(p). (2)
By definition of v? and since φ is continuous with v?(p)− φ(p) = 0, we
may find a sequence (pn)n∈N in (0, 1) converging to p along which
γn := v(pn)− φ(pn)
vanishes. Choose any strictly positive sequence (hn)n∈N in R such that
hn → 0 and γn/hn → 0 as n→∞.
Consider the ‘full tilt forever’ strategy which sets λt = 1 a.s. no matter
what happens. Write Pns for the induced (belief) process when the initial
condition is P0 = pn. Since v(p0) is the optimal value, it must exceed the
expected discounted payoff obtained by using the ‘full tilt forever’ control
process until time hn, then reverting to optimal behaviour:
v(pn) ≥ E
(
r
∫ hn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt+ e−rhnv
(
Pnhn
)) ∀n ∈ N.
Using v − φ ≥ v? − φ ≥ 0 and the definition of γn yields
φ(pn) + γn ≥ E
(
r
∫ hn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt+ e−rhnφ
(
Pnhn
)) ∀n ∈ N. (3)
Since φ is twice continuously differentiable and Pnt evolves as
dPnt =
Pnt (1− Pnt )
σ
dBt
where (Bt)t∈R+ is a standard Brownian motion, we may apply Itô’s lemma
to the process
(
e−rtφ (Pnt )
)
t∈R+ to obtain, for each n ∈ N,
e−rhnφ
(
Pnhn
)
= φ (pn)− r
∫ hn
0
e−rtφ (Pnt ) dt
+ 12
∫ hn
0
(
Pnt (1− Pnt )
σ
)2
e−rtφ′′ (Pnt ) dt.
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Substituting in (3) and rearranging slightly yields
γn
hn
≥ E
(
r
1
hn
∫ hn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt− r
1
hn
∫ hn
0
e−rtφ (Pnt ) dt
+ r 1
hn
∫ hn
0
e−rt
(Pnt )2 (1− Pnt )2
2rσ2 φ
′′ (Pnt ) dt
)
∀n ∈ N. (4)
We will obtain (2) as the limit of this inequality as n→∞.
Since φ is twice continuously differentiable and the sample paths of
(Pnt )t∈R+ are continuous a.s., the mean-value theorem may be applied path-
by-path to the second and third terms inside the expectation in (4) to
conclude that they converge a.s. to, respectively, −φ(p) and
p2(1− p)2
2rσ2 φ
′′(p).
It remains to show that the first term converges a.s. to a limit that exceeds
u?(p). If p is a continuity point of u, then u is continuous on a neighbourhood
of p by piecewise continuity, so the same mean-value-theorem argument
implies that the first term converges a.s. to u(p) ≥ u?(p), as desired.
Suppose instead that p is a discontinuity point of u; this requires an
additional argument relative to the standard proof. By piecewise continuity,
u is continuous on a left- and a right-neighbourhood of p. Thus for any
sufficiently small ε > 0, we may apply the mean-value theorem on either side
of p to obtain the existence of a pε− ∈ (p− ε, p) and a pε+ ∈ (p, p+ ε) such
that
1
ε
∫ p
p−ε
u = u
(
pε−
)
and 1
ε
∫ p+ε
p
u = u
(
pε+
)
,
so that
1
2ε
∫ p+ε
p−ε
u ≥ min {u (pε−) , u (pε+)} .
The left-hand side converges as ε ↓ 0, and the right-hand side converges to
min{u(p−), u(p+)}. Thus
lim
ε→0
1
2ε
∫ p+ε
p−ε
u ≥ min {u (p−) , u (p+)} ≥ u?(p).
As with the second and third terms in (4), we may apply this argument to
a.e. path of the first term since a.e. sample path of (Pnt )t∈R+ is continuous.
Thus the first term in (4) converges a.s. to a limit that exeeds u?(p).
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Next, observe that all three terms inside the expectation in (4) are
bounded off D by a constant independent of n because φ, φ′′ and u are
continuous off D. Furthermore, the set D is null according to the occu-
pancy measure of (Pnt )t∈R+ , for every n ∈ N.51 It follows by the bounded
convergence theorem that the right-hand side of (4) converges to a limit
exceeding
u?(p)− φ(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 φ
′′(p).
The left-hand side of (4) vanishes by construction of (hn)n∈N. Thus
0 ≥ u?(p)− φ(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 φ
′′(p).
Using φ(p) = v?(p) and rearranging yields the desired inequality (2). 
Unlike the super-solution property of v?, the sub-solution property of v?
holds for general u:
Lemma 1(b). v? is a viscosity sub-solution of (HJB).
Proof. Again, we follow the standard line of reasoning (e.g. Pham (2009,
Proposition 4.3.2), noting the errata (Pham, 2012)) for the case in which u
is continuous. Where continuity of u is usually invoked, we shall make do
with the (definitional) upper semi-continuity of u?.
Take any p ∈ (0, 1) and any twice continuously differentiable φ : (0, 1)→
R such that φ− v? has a local minimum at p. By Remark 1, we may assume
without loss that φ(p)− v?(p) = 0. Suppose that the viscosity sub-solution
property fails at p:
φ(p) = v?(p) > u?(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(p)
}
.
We shall derive a contradiction.
By Remark 1 again, we may assume that φ − v? has a strict global
minimum at p. For η > 0, write
Bη := {q ∈ (0, 1) : |q − p| < η}
for the open ball of radius η around p, and ∂Bη for its boundary. Define
kη := min
q∈∂Bη
|φ(q)− v?(q)|,
51This is because the occupancy measure is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure, and D is Lebesgue-null since it is discrete.
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noting that it is strictly positive for η > 0 because the minimum of φ− v? at
p is strict. Since φ and φ′′ are continuous and u? is upper semi-continuous,
we may find an η > 0 and an ε ∈ (0, kη] small enough that
φ(q) ≥ u?(q) + q
2(1− q)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(q)
}
+ ε for all q ∈ Bη. (5)
By definition of v? and since φ is continuous with φ(p)− v?(p) = 0, we
may find a sequence (pn)n∈N in Bη converging to p along which
γn := φ(pn)− v(pn)
vanishes. Let (λnt )t∈R+ be an ε/2-best reply in the principal’s best-reply
problem with prior p0 = pn, and write (Pnt )t∈R+ for the belief process
induced by this strategy. Let τn be the first exit time of (Pnt )t∈R+ from Bη.
Using (λnt )t∈R+ only until time τn and then reverting to optimal behaviour
is even better, so certainly attains value at least v(pn)− ε/2:
v(pn)− ε2 ≤ E
(
r
∫ τn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt+ e−rτnv
(
Pnτn
))
.
Subtracting φ(pn) from both sides and using the fact that
φ− v ≥ φ− v? ≥ kη ≥ ε on ∂Bη
yields
− γn − ε2 ≤ E
(
−e−rτnε+ r
∫ τn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt+ e−rτnφ
(
Pnτn
)− φ(pn)) .
(6)
Since φ is twice continuously differentiable and Pnt evolves as
dPnt = λnt
Pnt (1− Pnt )
σ
dBt
where (Bt)t∈R+ is a standard Brownian motion, we may apply Itô’s lemma
to the process
(
e−rtφ (Pnt )
)
t∈R+ to obtain, for each n ∈ N,
e−rτnφ
(
Pnτn
)
= φ (pn)− r
∫ τn
0
e−rtφ (Pnt ) dt
+ 12
∫ τn
0
(√
λnt
Pnt (1− Pnt )
σ
)2
e−rtφ′′ (Pnt ) dt.
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Substituting in (6) and using (5) yields
− γn − ε2 ≤ E
(
−e−rτnε
+ r
∫ τn
0
e−rt
[
−φ (Pnt ) + u (Pnt ) +
(Pnt )2 (1− Pnt )2
2rσ2 λ
n
t φ
′′ (Pnt )
]
dt
)
≤ E
(
−e−rτnε
+ r
∫ τn
0
e−rt
[
−φ (Pnt ) + u (Pnt ) +
(Pnt )2 (1− Pnt )2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′ (Pnt )
}]
dt
)
≤ E
(
−e−rτnε+ r
∫ τn
0
e−rt(−ε)dt
)
= −ε.
Since γn vanishes as n→∞, we have the contradiction −ε/2 ≤ −ε. 
It remains only to show that v = v? = v?, i.e. that v is continuous.
Lemma 1(c). If u is piecewise continuous, then v is continuous.
Proof. We deal separately with {0, 1} and (0, 1). Begin with continuity at 0;
the argument at 1 is analogous. Take a sequence (pn)n∈N in (0, 1) converging
to 0; we will show that v(pn)→ u(0) = v(0).
At each n ∈ N, consider the auxiliary problem in which the principal
may choose any process (pt)t∈R+ satisfying E(pt) = pn for every t ∈ R+. The
value V (pn) of this problem must exceed v(pn) since any belief process the
principal can induce in her best-reply problem is available in the auxiliary
problem. And we have V (pn) ≤ (cav u)(pn) since the auxiliary problem may
broken down into a sequence of independent static persuasion problems, in
each of which the optimal value is at most (cav u)(pn).52 Thus we have
u(pn) ≤ v(pn) ≤ V (pn) ≤ (cav u)(pn) for every n ∈ N.
As n→∞, u(pn)→ u(0) since u is continuous at 0 by piecewise continuity,
and (cav u)(pn) → u(0) since cav u is continuous and (cav u)(0) = u(0)
because u is continuous at 0. It follows that u(0) ≤ limn→∞ v(pn) ≤ u(0).
To establish that v is continuous on (0, 1), fix a p ∈ (0, 1). It suffices to
show that v ≥ v, where
v := lim inf
q→p v(q) and v := lim supq→p
v(q).
52If u is upper semi-continuous, then V = cav u.
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By construction, there exist sequences
(
p
n
)
n∈N and (pn)n∈N converging to p
along which
v
(
p
n
)→ v and v (pn)→ v as n→∞.
Note that v is bounded since u is (being piecewise continuous).
Suppose first that these sequences may both be chosen to lie in (0, p);
the case in which they may be chosen to lie in (p, 1) is analogous. Then we
may choose them so that pn−1 ≤ pn ≤ pn for every n ∈ N, where p0 := 0
by convention. For the principal’s best-reply problem with prior p0 = pn,
consider a strategy that sets λ = 1 while pt ∈ (pn−1, pn) and λ = 0 otherwise,
and write (Pnt )t∈R+ for the induced belief process. Write τn for the first time
that (Pnt )t∈R+ hits {pn−1, pn}. Since this strategy cannot be better than
optimal, we have
v
(
p
n
) ≥ E(r ∫ τn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt+ e−rτnv
(
Pnτn
))
for each n ∈ N.
The left-hand side converges to v as n→∞. The hitting time τn vanishes
a.s., and v
(
Pnτn
)
converges a.s. to v. Furthermore, u and v are bounded
by piecewise continuity.53 Hence the right-hand side converges to v by the
bounded convergence theorem, so that v ≥ v.
Suppose instead that the sequences cannot be chosen to lie on the same
side of p—without loss of generality, p
n
< p < pn for every n ∈ N. For the
principal’s problem with p0 = pn, consider a strategy that sets λ = 1 while
pt ∈
(
p
n−1, pn
)
and λ = 0 otherwise, and write (Pnt )t∈R+ for the induced
belief process. Let τn be the first time that (Pnt )t∈R+ hits
{
p
n−1, pn
}
. The
optimal value must exceed the value from using this strategy:
v
(
p
n
) ≥ E(r ∫ τn
0
e−rtu (Pnt ) dt+ e−rτnv
(
Pnτn
))
for each n ∈ N. (7)
The left-hand side converges to v as n→∞. The hitting time τn vanishes
a.s. since
∣∣pn − pn∣∣→ 0. For each n ∈ N, we have
E
(
v
(
Pnτn
))
= γnv
(
p
n−1
)
+ (1− γn)v (pn)
for some γn ∈ (0, 1), and the sequences
(
p
n
)
n∈N and (pn)n∈N may be chosen
so that (γn)n∈N converges to some γ < 1. Thus, applying the bounded
convergence theorem (using the boundedness of u and v) to (7) yields
v ≥ γv + (1− γ)v, which is equivalent to v ≥ v since γ < 1. 
53v is bounded below by u, and is bounded above by V ≤ cav u, where V is the value of
the auxiliary problem in the first part of the proof.
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B Proof of Lemma 2 (p. 21)
Take p ∈ (0, 1) \ C, and suppose toward a contradiction that v(p) > u(p).
Since v is continuous and u is upper semi-continuous, we have v > u on
an open neighbourhood N of p. We will derive a contradiction assuming
that p /∈ D. The result for p ∈ D then follows from the observation that if
v(p) > u(p) for p ∈ D, then since D is discrete, the neighbourhood N also
contains a p′ /∈ D at which v(p′) > u(p′).
We may choose N to not intersect D since the latter is discrete. By
Lemma 1 (p. 18) and the fact that v > u on N , v is a viscosity solution of
w(p) = u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 w
′′(p) (8)
on N . Observe that u is continuous on N .
We show (constructively) in supplemental appendix F that (8) has a
classical (hence viscosity) solution w† on N which satisfies the (Dirichlet)
boundary condition w† = v on ∂N . By the comparison principle (e.g. Theorem
3.3. in Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992)), w† is the unique viscosity solution
of (8) on N satisfying this boundary condition. It follows that v = w†.
Since v > u on N , (8) requires that v′′ > 0 on N . But then N ⊆ C,
contradicting the supposition that p lies in (0, 1) \ C. 
C Proof of Lemma 3 (p. 21)
Since a differentiable locally convex function is continuously differentiable
(see e.g. Theorem 24.1 in Rockafellar (1970)), it suffices to show that v is
differentiable on C. By local convexity, the left- and right-hand derivatives
v′− and v′+ of v exist on C and satisfy v′− ≤ v′+ (again, see Theorem 24.1 in
Rockafellar (1970)). We must show that v′− = v′+.
To that end, take a p ∈ C, and suppose toward a contradiction that
v′−(p) < v′+(p). (That is, there is a convex kink at p.) Then for any k > 0, we
may find a twice continuously differentiable φ : (0, 1)→ R with φ′′(p) = k
such that v−φ is locally minimised at p.54 Since v is a viscosity super-solution
of (HJB) by Lemma 1, it follows that
v(p) ≥ u?(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 k
for any k > 0. For large enough k, this contradicts the previously-established
fact that v(p) ≤ (cav u)(p).
54For example, φ(q) := v(p) + 12 [v
′
−(p) + v′+(p)](q − p) + 12k(q − p)2.
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D Proof of Lemma 4 (p. 21)
Since v is locally convex on C \ D, v′′ is non-negative whenever it exists.
Thus by Lemma 1 (p. 18), v is a viscosity solution of the differential equation
w(p) = u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 w
′′(p). (9)
on C \D. Note that u is continuous on C \D.
In supplemental appendix F, we show constructively that (9) has a
classical solution on C \D that can be extended to a continuous function
w† : C → R satisfying the (Dirichlet) boundary condition w† = u on ∂C. By
the comparison principle (e.g. Theorem 3.3. in Crandall et al. (1992)), w† is
the unique viscosity solution of (9) that satisfies this boundary condition.
Since w† is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies (9) on C \D, it
suffices to show that v = w† on C \D.
Since v is locally convex on C \D, it is twice differentiable a.e. on C \D
by the Aleksandrov theorem (e.g. Theorem A.2 in Crandall et al. (1992)), so
v′′ exists on a dense subset B of C \D. Being a derivative, v′′ is continuous on
a dense subset A of B.55 It follows that v satisfies (9) on A. We have already
shown that it satisfies the boundary condition v = u on ∂C ⊆ [0, 1] \ C.
Since the solution w† is unique, v coincides with w† on A. Because A is
dense in C \D, v|A admits at most one continuous extension to C \D. Since
w† is continuous, it follows that v = w† on C \D. 
Supplemental appendix
E Welfare with heterogeneous priors (§6)
In this appendix, we give a condition on preferences under which when the
conflict of interest is purely belief-based, the principal is better-off the closer
the agent’s prior is to her own. For simplicity, we focus on equilibria in which
the agent uses a pure strategy A : [0, 1]→ A.
Since the agent’s preferences differ from the principal’s only due to
their belief disagreement, it is natural to conjecture that the principal is
better-off the smaller the prior disagreement. This intuition is incorrect in
general because for arbitrary preferences f , the principal need not always
55This is a consequence of the Baire category theorem—see Bruckner and Leonard (1966,
p. 27).
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prefer actions taken by an agent with a belief closer to her own.56 But the
assertion is true for expected-utility preferences, and more generally under a
single-crossing assumption:
Proposition 5. Suppose that fP = fa = f , and that the actions A can
be ordered so that f is strictly single-crossing.57 Then for a fixed p0 and
pa,0 < p0 (pa,0 > p0), v(p0) increases pointwise as pa,0 increases (decreases).
Strict single-crossing is satisfied whenever f has the expected-utility
form.58 Its role is to ensure that the principal prefers actions taken by an
agent with a belief closer to her own. This is a general property of single-
crossing, embodied in the following comparative statics lemma.
Lemma 5. Let (T ,&) and (X ,) be partially ordered sets, let f : T ×
X → R be strictly single-crossing, and let x : T → X be a selection from
t 7→ arg maxx∈X f(x, t). Then for t1 & t2 & t3 in T , we have f(x(t2), t1) ≥
f(x(t3), t1) and f(x(t2), t3) ≥ f(x(t1), t3).
Proof. Since f is strictly single-crossing, x must be increasing by the mono-
tone selection theorem of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), so in particular
x(t2) ≥ x(t3). Since x(t2) is optimal at parameter t2, we have f(x(t2), t2) ≥
f(x(t3), t2). Since x(t2)  x(t3) and t1 & t2, and f is single-crossing, it follows
that f(x(t2), t1) ≥ f(x(t3), t1). The argument for f(x(t2), t3) ≥ f(x(t1), t3)
is analogous. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider pa,0 < p′a,0 < p0; the other case is analogous.
Write A : [0, 1]→ A for the agent’s pure, myopic and regular Markov strategy.
Write u and u′ for the corresponding induced flow payoff for the principal,
and v and v′ for her value function.
56Consider A = {0, 1}, f(0, p) = 1/2 and f(1, p) = 1 − 1(1/3,2/3)(p), and p0 = 5/6. If
the agent’s prior is pa,0 = 1/6, then the principal can (and does) earn 1 forever by never
funding, so v(p0) = 1. If instead pa,0 = 1/2, then v(p0) < 1 since she earns 1/2 early on.
57That is: there is a partial order  on A such that for a′  a and p′ > p, f(a′, p) ≥ f(a, p)
implies f(a′, p′) > f(a, p′).
58An expected utility f satisfies f(a, p) = (1− p)u0(a) + pu1(a) for some maps u0, u1 :
A → R. Define an order  on A by a′  a iff u1(a′)− u0(a′) ≥ u1(a)− u0(a). Then f is
strictly single-crossing: for given a′  a and p′ > p, f(a′, p) ≥ f(a, p) is equivalent to
p([u1(a′)− u0(a′)]− [u1(a)− u0(a)]) ≥ u0(a)− u0(a′),
which since p′ > p and a′  a implies that
p′([u1(a′)− u0(a′)]− [u1(a)− u0(a)]) > u0(a)− u0(a′),
which is equivalent to f(a′, p′) > f(a, p).
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Since A is myopic, it is a selection from
p 7→ arg max
a∈A
f(a, p).
Fix any belief p ∈ [0, 1] of the principal. Write pa := φ(p, p0, pa,0) and
p′a := φ(p, p0, p′a,0) for the agent’s corresponding beliefs given her prior, and
note that pa ≤ p′a ≤ p. Since f is strictly single-crossing, it follows by
Lemma 5 that
u′(p) = f(A(φ(p, p0, pa′,0)), p) = f(A(p′a), p)
≥ f(A(pa), p) = f(A(φ(p, p0, pa,0)), p) = u(p).
Since p ∈ [0, 1] was arbitrary, this shows that u′ ≥ u, which obviously implies
that v′(p0) ≥ v(p0). 
F Solving for the value function
In this appendix, we explain how to solve for the principal’s value function
using Proposition 1. We detail in particular how the value is computed in
the two- and three-action examples, allowing us to draw Figures 3 and 4.
Partition C\D into maximal intervals (Rk)Kk=1.59 Fix a continuity interval
Rk. The homogeneous part (without the u) of the differential equation (∂)
in Proposition 1 has general solution AH1 − BH2 for constants A,B ∈ R,
where
H1(p) := pξ(1− p)1−ξ and ξ := 1/2 +
√
1/4 + 2rσ2,
and H2(p) := H1(1− p).
A particular solution may be obtained from formula (6.2) in Coddington
(1961, ch. 3). Things are easier when the principal has expected-utility
preferences, so that u is affine, as u itself is then a particular solution. This
is the case in the two- and three-action examples. In the expected-utility
case, the value function is given on each maximal interval Rk of C \D as
v(p) = u(p) +ARkH1(p)−BRkH2(p) for all p ∈ Rk,
where the constants (ARk , BRk)
K
k=1 are the unique ones that ensure that the
properties in Proposition 1 are satisfied: the boundary condition v = u on
{0, 1}, the continuity of v on D, and smooth pasting on C ∪D.
59In the two-action example, the maximal intervals are [0, 2/3) and (2/3, 1]. In the
three-action example, they are [0, 1/2), (1/2, 3/4) and (3/4, 1].
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F.1 The two-action example (§1.1)
Here D = {2/3}, and C contains [0, 2/3) and may or may not contain [2/3, 1].
In either case,
v(p) =
{
A[0,2/3)H1(p)−B[0,2/3)H2(p) for p ∈ [0, 1/2)
αp− β +A(2/3,1]H1(p)−B(2/3,1]H2(p) for p ∈ (2/3, 1],
where α = 3/2 and β = 1/2.60 The boundary conditions require that
B[0,2/3) = 0 and A(2/3,1] = 0. Continuity of v at 2/3 requires that
A[0,2/3)H1(2/3) = α(2/3)− β −B(2/3,1]H2(2/3).
If rσ2 is sufficiently low, then 2/3 ∈ C, in which case smooth pasting
must hold at 2/3:
A[0,2/3)H
′
1(2/3) = α−B(2/3,1]H ′2(2/3).
Thus the constants are uniquely pinned down.
If rσ2 is high, then 2/3 /∈ C, in which case v = u on [2/3, 1]. Thus
B(2/3,1] = 0, whence A[0,2/3) is uniquely pinned down by the continuity
condition.
To determine which case applies for a given value of rσ2, calculate A[0,2/3)
assuming that the first case applies. If
A[0,2/3)H1(2/3) ≥ u(1/2) = 1/2,
then the first case does indeed apply; if not, then not.
F.2 The three-action example (Figure 4)
Clearly C contains [0, 1/2) and (1/2, 3/4), and does not contain [3/4, 1]. Thus
the value function off D is
v(p) =

A[0,1/2)H1(p)−B[0,1/2)H2(p) for p ∈ [0, 1/2)
`+A(1/2,3/4)H1(p)−B(1/2,3/4)H2(p) for p ∈ (1/2, 3/4)
h,
60If C contains [2/3, 1] then the expression for p ∈ (2/3, 1] holds since (HJB) must be
satisfied in the classical sense by Proposition 1. If not, then Proposition 1 requires that
v = u, which amounts to setting A(2/3,1] = B(2/3,1] = 0.
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where ` = 1 and h = 3. The boundary condition at p = 0 again requires that
B[0,1/2) = 0. Continuity of v at 1/2 and at 3/4 requires that
A[0,1/2)H1(1/2) = `+A(1/2,3/4)H1(1/2)−B(1/2,3/4)H2(1/2)
and
`+A(1/2,3/4)H1(3/4)−B(1/2,3/4)H2(3/4) = h.
These are two equations in three unknowns.
If rσ2 is sufficiently low that 1/2 ∈ C, then smooth pasting must hold at
1/2, giving us the third equation
A[0,1/2)H
′
1(1/2) = A(1/2,3/4)H ′1(1/2)−B(1/2,3/4)H ′2(1/2).
If rσ2 is sufficiently high that 1/2 /∈ C, then v(1/2) = u(1/2) = `. We
thus obtain a third equation from the requirement that v be continuous at
1/2:
A[0,1/2)H1(1/2) = `.
To discern which case applies, compute A[0,1/2) assuming that the first
(patient) case applies. If
A[0,1/2)H1(1/2) ≥ `,
then the patient case does indeed apply; otherwise, it does not.
G Generic uniqueness of long-run beliefs
We claimed in §5.1 that provided v(p0) > u(p0), generically, all best replies
of the principal induce the same long-run beliefs (viz. the beliefs {p−, p+}
defined in Corollary 3 (p. 24)).
To see how uniqueness can fail, consider the three-action example from
Figure 4 (p. 20). Figure 6a depicts the knife-edge case in which rσ2 is such
that the patient-case value function with the convex-flat shape in Figure 4c
touches u at 1/2.61 In this case, the principal is indifferent between funding
and not funding at 1/2, and strictly prefers to fund on (0, 1/2) and (0, 3/4).
The best reply Λ? from Corollary 2 (p. 23) stops at 1/2, inducing the long-run
beliefs {p−, p+} = {1/2, 3/4} from Corollary 3. But since the principal is
indifferent at 1/2, she also has a best reply that funds at 1/2, and this induces
the long-run beliefs {0, 3/4}.
61We thank Jeff Ely for pointing out this scenario.
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(b) Two-action example from §1.1.
Figure 6 – Knife-edge cases in which long-run beliefs are not unique.
This scenario is non-generic in the sense that slightly decreasing rσ2
puts us back in Figure 4c, where the principal strictly prefers to fund at
1/2, whereas slightly increasing rσ2 puts us in Figure 4d, where she strictly
prefers to stop at 1/2.
Similarly, Figure 6b depicts the case in the two-action example of §1.1 in
which rσ2 has exactly the value needed for the patient-case value function
with the convex shape in Figure 3a to just touch u at 2/3. In this example,
there is more multiplicity: the principal is indifferent on [1/2, 1], so has best
replies that induce any mean-p0 distribution of long-run beliefs supported
on {0} ∪ [2/3, 1]. (The best reply Λ? induces the beliefs {0, 2/3}.) Again,
perturbing rσ2 makes the principal’s preference strict at 2/3, so that long-run
induced beliefs are unique (either {0, 2/3} or {0, 1}).
The non-genericity of multiplicity in these examples is a general phe-
nomenon. Multiplicity occurs for some prior p0 with v(p0) > u(p0) precisely if
the principal is indifferent between stopping and continuing at some p ∈ (0, 1)
and weakly prefers to continue on a neighbourhood of p. In such cases, her
preference becomes strict when rσ2 is perturbed slightly.
H An example with gradual convergence
In the two- and three-action examples, the long-run induced beliefs of a
sufficiently patient planner coincide exactly with those in the persuasion
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benchmark. Figure 7 shows that this need not happen: here the long-run
induced beliefs converge to the persuasion beliefs P− and P+ as rσ2 → 0 as
per Proposition 3, but remain strictly less extreme for every rσ2 > 0.
I Piecewise continuity is merely tie-breaking
We asserted in §2.3 that provided the flow payoff fa is non-degenerate in a
mild sense, it is without loss of optimality for her to restrict attention to
piecewise continuous Markov strategies A : [0, 1]→ ∆(A).
To justify this claim, begin by recalling from §3 that the agent best-replies
to a Markov strategy of the principal by myopically maximising fa(a, p) at
each p.62 Fix two actions a, a′ ∈ A, and write
ψ(p) := fa(a, p)− fa(a′, p)
for their payoff difference. Say that ψ strictly up-crosses at p ∈ (0, 1) iff
ψ(p) = 0 and for any ε > 0, there are p′ ∈ (p− ε, p) and p′′ ∈ (p, p+ ε) such
that ψ(p′) < 0 < ψ(p′′), strictly down-crosses if the reverse inequalities hold,
and simply strictly crosses if either is the case. Write K ⊆ (0, 1) for the set
on which ψ strictly crosses. We claim that given some weak non-degeneracy
condition on fa, the crossing set K is discrete, so that the agent strictly
prefers to switch actions only on a discrete set. (It suffices to consider only
two arbitrary actions a, a′ ∈ A because A is finite.)
To see what can go wrong, suppose that fa(a, p) = 0 and that p 7→ fa(a′, p)
is a typical path of a standard Brownian motion. Then ψ is continuous, but
the strict crossing set K is non-empty with no isolated points (see e.g.
Theorem 9.6 in Karatzas and Shreve (1991, ch. 2)). This preference dithers
maniacally, wishing to switch actions back and forth extremely frequently.
As a first pass, observe that if ψ is monotone, or more generally if ψ
or −ψ has the single-crossing property (ψ(p) ≥(>) 0 implies ψ(p′) ≥(>) 0
for p < p′), then K is empty or a singleton, so certainly discrete. These
assumptions are satisfied by expected-utility preferences.
A weak non-degeneracy condition that suffices is local single-crossing: for
each p ∈ K, we have either ψ ≥ 0 or ψ ≤ 0 on a left-neighbourhood of p, and
similarly on a right-neighbourhood. Then each p ∈ K is manifestly the unique
strict crossing of ψ on a neighbourhood, hence isolated. A sufficient condition
for this is local monotonicity: for each p ∈ K, we have ψ(p−ε) ≤ 0 ≤ ψ(p+ε)
for all sufficiently small ε > 0, or the reverse inequality.
62This remains true if the agent is allowed to use any map A : [0, 1]→ ∆(A).
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Figure 7 – Example in which the long-run beliefs {p−, p+} are strictly less
extreme than the static persuasion beliefs {P−, P+} for every rσ2 > 0.
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J A very brief introduction to viscosity solutions
Crandall (1997), Katzourakis (2015) and Crandall et al. (1992) provide
overviews of the theory of viscosity solutions of second-order differential
equations. Moll (2017), Evans (2010, ch. 10), Calder (2018) and Bressan
(2011) give easier treatments that deal mostly with first-order equations.
The general idea of viscosity solutions is as follows. If w is a viscosity
solution of (HJB), then it must satisfy (HJB) in the classical sense on any
neighbourhood on which w′′ exists and is continuous. If w′′ does not exist at
p ∈ [0, 1], we require instead that (HJB) hold with the appropriate inequality
when w′′(p) is replaced by φ′′(p) for some twice continuously differentiable
local approximation φ to w at p. (The formal definition was given on p. 17.)
J.1 Illustration of the definition
Consider the three-action example from Figure 4a (p. 20). Write C2 for the set
of twice continuously differentiable functions (0, 1)→ R. Begin by observing
that v is continuous, hence upper and lower semi-continuous.
Consider a p in whose vicinity v is twice continuously differentiable, e.g.
p = 2/5. We may easily find φ1, φ2 ∈ C2 such that φ1 − v and v − φ2 are
locally minimised at p, as in Figure 8a. But in particular, we may choose
φ ∈ C2 to coincide with v on a neighbourhood of p. Then φ− v and v − φ
are both locally minimised at p, and φ′′(p) = v′′(p). Since v is a viscosity
sub-solution (super-solution) by Lemma 1 (p. 18), and u(p) = u?(p) = u?(p),
it follows that
v(p) ≤(≥) u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, v′′(p)
}
.
So (HJB) must be satisfied in the classical sense at p.
Next consider a point at which v′′ is undefined, e.g. p = 1/2. There
are many φ ∈ C2 such that φ − v has a local minimum at p; an example
is depicted in Figure 8b. Since v is a viscosity sub-solution of (HJB) and
u?(p) = u(p), we must have
v(p) ≤ u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(p)
}
for any such φ. In fact, φ can be chosen so that φ′′(p) ≤ 0: the φ depicted in
Figure 8c is affine, so has φ′′(p) = 0. The sub-solution condition therefore
requires precisely that
v(p) ≤ inf
φ∈C2:
φ− v loc. min. at p
{
u(p) + p
2(1− p)2
2rσ2 max
{
0, φ′′(p)
}}
= u(p),
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(d) φ ∈ C2 for which v − φ does not have
a local minimum at 1/2.
Figure 8 – Functions φ ∈ C2 that approximate v locally.
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which holds (with equality, in fact).
By contrast, there are no φ ∈ C2 such that v − φ has a local minimum at
p; a (failed) attempt to find such a φ is drawn in Figure 8d. The fact that v
is a viscosity super-solution of (HJB) therefore has no bite at p = 1/2.
J.2 Some properties of viscosity solutions
There are other non-classical notions of ‘solution’ of a differential equation,
most importantly distributional solutions (e.g. Evans (2010, chs. 5–9)). But
for many differential equations, including HJB equations, viscosity solutions
are the appropriate notion. The chief reasons are twofold: viscosity solutions
exist, and they satisfy a comparison principle.
Begin with existence. Many HJB equations, including ours, fail to have a
classical solution. Many also fail to have non-classical solutions of e.g. the
distributional variety. By contrast, HJB equations always have a viscosity
solution.
The other principal virtue of viscosity solutions is that they satisfy a
comparison principle (also called a ‘maximum principle’) of the following
kind: if w is a sub-solution on (a, b), w is a super-solution on (a, b), and
w ≤ w on {a, b}, then w ≤ w on (a, b). (See Crandall et al. (1992, Theorem
3.3).) Classical sub- and super-solutions also satisfy a comparison principle,
but other non-classical notions of ‘solution’ do not.
The comparison principle may be used to obtain uniqueness results; a
standard one is that the HJB equation has at most one viscosity solution
with the right boundary conditions satisfying a linear-growth condition. It
follows that the value function is the unique solution with the right boundary
conditions and linear growth. (See Fleming and Soner (2006, ch. V).) We use
the comparision principle in this manner in the proofs of Lemmata 2 and 4
(appendices B and D).
The comparison principle may also be used to establish the continuity of
solutions, and thus of the value function. In particular, suppose that we have
shown that the upper (lower) semi-continuous envelope v? (v?) of the value
v is a sub-solution (super-solution) of the HJB equation, and that v? = v?
on {0, 1}. (We do precisely this in the proof of Lemma 1 in appendix J.) A
comparison principle then yields v? ≤ v?, which since v? ≤ v ≤ v? implies
that v is itself a viscosity solution, hence continuous.
In our proof of Lemma 1 (appendix A), we eschew this approach in favour
of a direct proof that v is continuous. We do this because we are not aware of
a comparision principle that applies assuming only piecewise continuity of u.
The closest result that we know of is Theorem 3.3 in Soravia (2006), which
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would be applicable under the additional hypotheses that u has only finitely
many discontinuities and satisfies u(p) ∈ [u(p−) ∧ u(p+), u(p−) ∨ u(p+)] at
every p ∈ (0, 1).
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